

Thesis

International Implications of the  
Greek Civil War Prior to the  
Truman Doctrine

E.C. Christodouloupoulos

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BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE GREEK  
CIVIL WAR PRIOR TO THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

by

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-LL.B Athens University-

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## INTRODUCTION

### The International Position of Greece

Greece today is considered by the United States a most dangerous spot in the world. Her strategical position is of tremendous importance. Napoleon used to say that from the strategical point of view the two Greek islands, Corfu and Zante, at the entrance of the Adriatic Sea, were more important to France than the whole Italian Peninsula.<sup>1</sup> Greece and her islands are the bridge which connect three continents, --Europe, Asia, and Africa. Because ideology does not change geography and because geopolitics more often influence the foreign policy of the nations, Greece had always been the battleground in which the interests of the big powers had always clashed.

On the one hand Russia always tried by every possible means to dominate the Greek Peninsula; on the other hand the Western European powers tried to prevent this because they considered it a treat to their own security. This fight for the domination of the Balkans constitutes the famous Eastern Question.

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1. Seferiades, S. P., -Public International Law-Vol.I, p.341.

## INTRODUCTION

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<sup>1</sup> Encyclopedia of International Law, Vol. I, p. 141.



Even as far back as the latter part of the eighteenth century when Catherine the Great was moving southward towards the Balkan Peninsula, French and British diplomats were smitten with increasing fear lest by seizing the Bosphorous the Czars would not merely become the unshakable dominators of the Near East, but by controlling all the direct routes to India would spread their aegis over the remoter Orient.<sup>2</sup>

During the nineteenth century Great Britain tried to thwart Russia's efforts to dominate the Balkans. During the Greek revolution of 1821, Great Britain and Russia had opposite aims in Greece. There is no doubt that each power was influenced by her own special interests in conducting her policy towards the Greek affair. But a detailed study of the Greek revolt leave no doubt in anyone's mind that Great Britain's interests coincided with those of Greece and thus proved more successful in handling the Greek situation. A brief discussion of the whole question proves beyond any doubt the truthfulness of the above statement.

On March 25, 1821, in the Morea, the Greek population rose in revolt and asserted their Independence by massacring every Turk on whom they could lay their hands. The Sultan's fury was raised to ungovernable pitch by his impotence to punish the rebels. The Greek Patriarch at Constantinople was accused of treason and hanged. This created a serious in-

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2. Davis, William Stearns, -A Short History of the Near East, p. 276.





ternational situation in Europe. The grave question was --, what would be the attitude of the autocratic powers of Europe, namely, Austria, Prussia, and Russia? The whole Greek question was going to be discussed at a European Congress in Verona in 1822.

Lord Castlereagh, the British Foreign Minister, was suspicious of Russia and not sure of the success of the Greek cause. Nevertheless Castlereagh showed a sympathetic attitude towards the Greek revolution. He had arranged to attend the Conference in person, but in the very midst of preparations for his departure he was seized with illness. This led to his death, and before many weeks his sceptre had passed into the hands of Canning. Before his fatal seizure, Castlereagh had drawn up for his own guidance at the Congress, a memorandum which had been approved by his colleagues and the King. This memorandum goes far to vindicate Castlereagh's reputation as a statesman and to prove the essential identity of his policy with that of Canning which has won undying fame. Castlereagh, as the writer has hinted, has been harshly judged. "Two more years of life, two more years of change, in the relations of England to the Continent would have given Castlereagh a different figure in the history of both Greece and America," as Mr. Fylee justly remarks.<sup>3</sup>

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3. Marriot, J.A.R.-George Canning and His Times, a Political Study, -pp.90-91.

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George Canning became minister of foreign affairs in 1822 succeeding Castlereagh in the Foreign Office. His policy epitomized Britain's increasing divergence from the theme of continental suppression of rising national movements. He was known to have Philhellenic sympathies<sup>4</sup> and formally recognized the Greek blockade in March 1823, which was a decisive step for the Greek cause.<sup>5</sup>

On the other hand, Russia became a danger to the success of the Greek Revolution. The Emperor of Russia, Alexander I, in 1824, invited the European Powers to write in a congress a plan which would force the Turks to accept a scheme for the settlement of Greece. The Russian plan of pacification was calculated to win the assent of the Holy Alliance, by suppressing everything in Greece that appeared to have a revolutionary tendency. It proposed to return the Greeks to such a degree of subjection to Turkey that they would always stand in need of Russian protection.<sup>6</sup>

This plan however, which proposed to erect the three provinces of the Morea and East and West Hellas into tributary principalities on the model of Moldavia and Wallachia, found favor with no one. Canning refused to consider any scheme that did not recognize the right of the Greeks to mould their

4. Miller, W.- The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, -p.84.

5. Crawley, C.W.- The Question of Greek Independence, -p.27.

6. Finlay, George-The History of the Greek Revolution, -p.164.

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4. Miller, W. - The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, p. 84.
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In 1826 Great Britain took the initiative in solving the Greek problem. Alexander I of Russia had died and had been succeeded by Nicholas I, well known for his reactionary policies, who called the Greek revolution "Greek pest".<sup>9</sup> The Duke of Wellington was sent to St. Petersburg with definite instructions from his government to find a possible solution to the problem which would be acceptable to the Russian government. As a result of long and persistent negotiations the Protocol of St. Petersburg of April 4, 1826, which marked a very successful beginning in solving the Greek question, was signed between England and Russia.

This Protocol was followed by the Treaty of London of July 6, 1827, signed by Great Britain, France, and Russia. This treaty is very significant because it meant a further decisive advance towards achieving Greek independence.

7. Phillips, W.A. - The War of Greek Independence, p.93.

8. Sergeant, L. - Greece in the 19th Century, -p.172.

9. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, -p.93.

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The Battle of Navarino enforced the provisions of the above Acts. on October 20, 1827, before the sun went down, the Turko-Egyptian ships "had disappeared,- the Bay of Navarino was covered with their wrecks." Unfortunately, before it was fought, the great statesman directly responsible for the policy which led up to it, had passed away.<sup>10</sup> The pride of Ibrahim was humbled in the dust, and the freedom of Greece was thunderously proclaimed amid the roar of Codrington's guns.

Whether Codrington acted according to the spirit of his instructions is a secret buried in the grave of Canning. All contemporaries agreed that Canning would not have acted like his successors, in showing a chilling disregard of a gallant sailor for winning a great victory. This incident, even had he not foreseen it, would have given him a unique opportunity for enlisting popular interest in the Greeks. It seems likely, too, that he would have sent the fleet to the Dardanelles. On these points no man can be sure. But it is certain that Canning had decided to protect Greece against Turkish aggression in the future, that he contemplated her independence as possible, and that, but for him, there would have been no intervention. Some had held that it was Byron, others that it was Codrington who liberated Greece. Yet there are some, and among these are the Turks, who say that, "the

10. Stapleton, A.G., Esq., - The Political Life of Mr. Canning, - p.

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10. Stapleton, A.G., Ed., - The Political Life of Mr. Canning, -



two Cannings were the men who tore Greece from their grasp." If this is so, the freedom of Greece was Canning's legacy to the world.<sup>11</sup>

This brief discussion of the Greek revolution proves that it was Great Britain and not Russia who helped the successful liberation of Greece. The interests of Great Britain and Greece were identical and Great Britain acted, guided by self-enlightened interests, whereas Russia was pursuing her traditional imperialistic designs in the Balkan Peninsula. She wanted a weak and divided Greece to serve her own interests, and the Memorandum of 1824 is the proof of her selfish plans. The Crimean War of 1853 is another landmark in the traditional struggle between Russia,--trying to control the Balkan Peninsula, the Straits, and the Dardanelles,--and the Western Powers, especially Great Britain, which always tried to thwart Russia's imperialistic designs.

Greece again found herself in the middle of this struggle. Unfortunately, this time Greece sided with Russia. This was largely due to the policy of the Royal House in Athens, a personal policy of King Otto and Queen Amalia. The King ignored the advice of his Foreign Minister, Paikos, and his ambassadors in London and Paris.<sup>12</sup> The result of the King's attitude was a joint intervention of Great Britain and

11. Temperley, H. - The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-27, p. 409.

12. Laskaris, S. Th., - Diplomatic History of Greece 1821-1941, p. 71.

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11. Tassoulas, A. - The Foreign Policy of Greece, 1830-1913, p. 109.  
12. Tassoulas, A. - The Foreign Policy of Greece, 1830-1913, p. 111.



France in Greece and allied occupation of the port of Piraeus.<sup>13</sup>  
This Franco-British occupation of Piraeus lasted until 1853.

During the second part of the nineteenth century a philosophical movement appeared in Russia, the so-called Pan-Slavism. Hegel, a Prussian philosopher, believed that the nineteenth century was the century which would see Prussia leading and dominating all the nations of the world. Hegel believed in the rising and declining of nations and Prussia now was the rising power. The Russians read Hegel's thesis, and adopted it with a fundamental change, that it was the Russians and not the Prussians who would lead all the nations of the world. The Russian Pan-Slavs used the community of race to serve their purpose in the Balkan Peninsula which was then a part of the Ottoman Empire. The Pan-Slav program had as its object the union of all the Slavs under the protection and control of Russia. Pan-Slavism became a new feature colouring Russian foreign policy in the eighteen-seventies. It was used by the imperialists of Russia for infiltrating the Balkans mostly inhabited by southern Slavs. General Ignatiev, the Russian Ambassador in Constantinople, was one of the protagonists and instigators of the Pan-Slav plans in the Balkan Peninsula. This plan provided for the emancipation of all the Slavs. Russia was going to be the prominent power in a huge Slavic Federation, and Russian Grand Dukes were to sit upon

13. Miller, William, -The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors.-p.222

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17. Miller, William, The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, p. 222



the new Slav thrones. Constantinople was going to be a free city, capital of the contemplated federation, with Russia enjoying special privileges.<sup>14</sup>

The question arises where the Greeks would have stood had such a scheme been successful. The answer is given by the Pan-Slavs themselves: the Greeks were to be given Thessaly, Epirus, and the islands, and nothing more.<sup>15</sup>

Once more Russia's aims conflicted fundamentally with those of the Greeks. The success of the Pan-Slav movement would mean a death blow to the national aspirations of the Greek race which contributed so much to contemporary western civilization. A small Greece, as contemplated by the Russian imperialists, could not last very long. History has taught us that when a far numerically superior people conquers a smaller people, sooner or later, the latter disappears and assimilates itself with the conqueror. Greece again faced a mortal danger from her northern Slav neighbors, especially Russia.

The first Russian success in realizing her Balkan policy was the creation of a Bulgarian Exarchate. On March 11, 1870, a firman was issued by the Sultan of Turkey, under terrific pressure from Russia, creating the Bulgarian Exarchate. This firman split the Greek Orthodox Church. The Bulgarian church became independent of the Patriarch of Constantinople.

<sup>14</sup>. Sumner, B.H., -Russia and the Balkans, -1870-1880, -p.73.

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14. Sumner, B. H., - Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880, p. 73.  
15. Ibid., p. 73.



The firman further stated that other places might pass under the authority of the Exarch if two-thirds of their inhabitants so desired. From that moment the Macedonian question was created and Macedonia became the battle-field of the rival Greek and Bulgarian propaganda. The Bulgarian Exarchate had brought not peace, but a sword.<sup>16</sup> This is another manifestation of the antithesis of the Greek and Slavic interests and aspirations.

The Treaty of San Stephano which was signed in 1878 represents a determined effort of Russia to accomplish her aims in the Balkan Peninsula. This Treaty was signed after a successful war by Russia against the Ottoman Empire. The most striking feature of the treaty was the creation of a greater Bulgaria, which was to be constituted as an autonomous tributary principality with a Christian government and a national militia, and was to extend from the Danube to the Aegean, nearly as far east as Medea (on the Black Sea) and Adrianople, and to include on the west the district around Monastiri, but not Salonica. The Ottoman Empire in Europe was practically annihilated. The proposed aggradizement of Bulgaria aroused grave concern in the other Balkan States.<sup>17</sup>

Fortunately, for the national aspirations of the other Balkan peoples, the Treaty of San Stephano was violently opposed by Great Britain and Austria and finally torn up. A

16. Miller, William, - The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, pp. 345-346.

17. Marriott, J.A.R. - The Eastern Question, - pp. 335-336.





greater Bulbaria would be a real danger for the Austro-Hungarian Empire because she would control, above all, the mouth of the Danube River. Great Britain's interests in Eastern Mediterranean would be greatly jeopardized. Once more the interests of Western Europe coincided with those of Greece, and Greece was once more saved from such a monstrous Russian plan. The Treaty of Berlin of 1878 gave new hopes to the Greeks for the fulfillment in the future of their national aims.

In 1912 the Balkan League against Turkey was formed. Although Russia favored its formation, she opposed any changes in the Balkans. She favored a status quo. But the Balkan peoples ignored the big powers and successfully concluded two wars against the Ottoman Empire.

At the end of the second Balkan War Russia again stubbornly opposed the fulfillment of the Greek national aspirations, and the question of Kavalla showed Russia's enmity towards the Greek nation. Russia was very anxious to give Kavally to Bulgaria. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, believed that Kavalla, in Bulgarian hands, would be a protection against Greek naval interference with Russia's cherished ambitions in regard to the Dardanelles. Sazonov used all his efforts at the Bucharest Peace Conference to get Kavalla restored to the Bulgarians.<sup>18</sup> He met with persistent opposition on the part of Great Britain and Germany and as a result

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18. Fay, Sidney B., -The Origins of the World War, pp.458-459.





the Russian effort of giving Kavalla to Bulgaria failed utterly.

During World War 1 the Russian and Greek interests were diametrically opposed. Both powers had an eye on Constantinople and the Straits.

As early as February 27, 1915, the Russian Ambassador in Athens, Demidov, informed the Russian foreign minister, Sazonov, that the contemplated campaign against the Dardanelles was arousing intense interest in Greece and that some Greek political leaders saw in it an opportunity for Greece "to accomplish in accord with the Triple Entente the great historic task". Sazonov advised Demidov that, "the imperial Government could not admit that the future of Constantinople and the Straits be settled other than in absolute conformity with the capital aspirations of the Russian people".<sup>19</sup> Russia once more violently opposed Greece's national policy. She would not allow Greece to participate in a campaign against the Dardanelles as a pawn of England. The result of Russia's opposition was the complete failure of the English expedition against the Dardanelles for two reasons, diplomatic and military: diplomatic in the sense of lack of unity among the western Allies and Russia, and in the refusal to allow the Greeks to enter the struggle; military in another sense, the British

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19. Howard, H.-The Partition of Turkey; A Diplomatic History 1913-1923, -p.123-4.





employed over 400,000 men in the campaign, while the Turks used 800,000.<sup>20</sup> Russia tried to make Bulgaria the pivot of her Balkan policy from the beginning of the war. However, she always opposed Greece for becoming the pivot of such a policy.

In 1915 the St. Petersburg government demanded a "radical" solution of the question in favor of Russia. This led to the secret agreements of March and April 1915, by which both France and England were forced, reluctantly, to cede Constantinople and the Straits to the Muscovites. The age old struggle in fulfillment of "Russia's historic mission" appeared to have reached a successful conclusion.<sup>21</sup>

Bulgaria, meanwhile, waited for some time, and when she thought that Germany was winning the war, she cunningly attacked her neighbors, including Greece. A defeated Bulgaria signed, with Greece, at the end of the war, the Treaty of Neilly of 1919. From 1912 to 1919, Bulgaria was in a continual state of warfare. Tsar Ferdinand joined the First Balkan War against Turkey, hoping to obtain Macedonia and a frontage on the Aegean. He miscalculated Bulgaria's further chances by striking against his allies in the Second Balkan War in 1913. Defeated, Bulgaria had to give up the Dobrudja to Rumania and lost practically all Macedonia to Serbia and Greece. Betting wrongly again during World War I by becoming a part-

20. Howard, H.-The Partition of Turkey; A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923, p.134.

21. Howard, H.-The Partition of Turkey; A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923, p.119.





ner of the Central Powers, Bulgaria saw her Aegean hopes grow dimmer. Tsar Ferdinand had to resign in favor of his son Boris.

For this achievement of Bulgarian nationalistic ambitions, three wars had been waged since the Berlin settlement of 1878. With the same end in view, Bulgaria joined the Axis 1941. Under Nazi ascendancy over the Balkans, Bulgaria obtained Southern Dobrudja, part of Thrace, Macedonia, and the western provinces that were annexed by Serbia in 1919. As an Axis satellite, Bulgaria's nationalism reached the zenith in political and territorial expansion. She annexed more territory as a result of her partnership with the Axis Powers in 1941, than she had under the Treaty of San Stephano in 1878.

In 1944 the Russian Army occupied Bulgaria. The Bulgarians, with their characteristic duplicity, attached themselves to the Russian "band wagon" as Allies, fighting for democracy, which they had done so much in the past to undermine. The Russians, pursuing their traditional imperialistic policy in the Balkans, forgot Bulgaria's crimes against her neighbors. They have since consistently supported Bulgaria in every international conference. This is the best example of Russia's ruthless and unscrupulous methods in pursuing her aims to expand in Southeastern Europe. Communist ideology is being used as a means of achieving Russia's traditional imperialistic aims in the Balkan Peninsula. Communist and fellow travellers denied Russian Imperialism by as-





serting that Russia only tried to spread "democracy" in this area.

In answering these false pretentions, it is worth quoting a speech made by the Czechoslovakian Minister of Transport, Alois Petr, on May 1, 1948, occasioned by the celebrating of the "Internationale Labor Day".

"Unity with the other Slav Nations and with the Eastern bloc in general was emphasized .....", ".....the German age in Europe had been followed by the Slav age and that Czechoslovakia, as the western tip of the Slav community, had an important role to play..."<sup>22</sup>

Pan-Slavism and Russian imperialism are beyond any doubt very active and constitute a danger to the maintenance of peace and security.

The Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1946<sup>7</sup> has as its purpose, among other things, to keep Greece free from falling into the hands of a Communist minority which would serve Russian imperialistic policy in that region, to rebuild free political institutions, and help the economic rehabilitation and reconstruction of Greece. However, there cannot be economic rehabilitation and reconstruction in a country unless we have political peace.

In the United Nations Charter (Preamble) we said, that we were "determined to save succeeding generations from scourge of war", by keeping the peace of the world. The United Nations Charter is only part of our policy. We do not

<sup>22</sup>. New York Times, May 2, 1948.





like to talk about "power politics" and the "balance of power" but, whether we like it or not, we have been engaged ever since the end of the war in a vast battle of power politics designed to preserve some kind of balance of power in Europe.

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan will be the test of our ability to build some kind of order in war-torn Europe.





## CHAPTER I

### The Axis Occupation of Greece

Relations between Greece and Italy had never been especially cordial; and from the time of Mussolini's accession to power, Greece figured in the Italian landscape chiefly as a candidate for admission to the Roman Empire about to be reborn.

In October 1940, the Führer and the Duce had conferred in state at the Brenner Pass, and apparently at that time Mussolini, flushed with the victories and prospective victories in Africa, had proposed that Italy should also take over Greece. Hitler apparently had agreed.<sup>1</sup>

It was obvious that the Italians along with the Germans believed that a campaign against Greece would be of a short duration, and that it would yield quick dividends in the form of an Axis fortress that would outflank the undecided or resisting nations of the Balkans, north of Greece, and at the same time, Turkey and the Dardanelles, while affording the stepping stone to Africa and the Middle East.

On October 28, 1940, on the expiration of the three hours ultimatum which "accused Greece of aiding Great Britain and which demanded permission for Italian troops to occupy

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1. Bemns, F. Lee, -Europe Since 1914, p. 534





strategic Greek bases in order to guarantee Greece's neutrality", Mussolini ordered his troops to advance across the Greek-Albania frontier.<sup>2</sup>

On the same day King George VI of Britain sent a message to King George II of Greece, saying, "We are with you in the struggle."

Mr. Churchill, the Prime Minister of England, cabled to General Metaxas, Prime Minister of Greece, the following message:

"We give you all the help in our power."<sup>3</sup>

A few months before the outbreak of the Second World War, the British Government had "guaranteed" the territorial integrity of Greece.

The invasion of the Italian troops in the Greco-Albanian frontier was not a surprise; Italian troops had been massing on the frontier for a long time. What occasioned surprise was the successful resistance of the outnumbered and poorly equipped Greeks. The Italians not only were stopped but the counterattacking Greeks put them to retreat, occupying a considerable part of Italian held Albanian territory.

The valor and intrepidity of Greek resistance changed major aspects of the Axis time table.

The Italian armies, ultimately numbering more than

2. Bennis, F. Lee, -Europe Since 1914, p. 534.

3. Ingram, Kenneth, -Year of Crisis. An outline of International History 1919-1945. p. 279.

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3. Barnes, F. Lee, - Europe Since 1914, p. 534.  
3. Ingram, Kenneth, - Year of Crisis, an outline of international  
History 1919-1945, p. 275.



half a million men and led by Mussolini himself, tried desperately to break the Greek front without any results. The only thing which they accomplished was suffering one defeat after another.

In the meantime, after it had been so successful against the Italian invasion, the Greek Government asked the British Government to honor its guarantee towards herself, to stem off any potential aggression from Italy's allies, Germany and Bulgaria.

Before this promise was fulfilled, the Greek Dictator John Metaxas, who was in power since August 4, 1936, died, and was succeeded by the King's nominee Korytzis, a former President of the Bank of Greece. Korytzis headed the Greek Government through the disastrous days of the German attack, but when defeat appeared to be imminent he committed suicide in April 19, 1941.<sup>4</sup>

Winston Churchill, despite disastrous experiences in France and Norway, did not lose his confidence for the final outcome of the war. He also felt the importance of demonstrating before the world that Britain would keep her promises even when being faced with extreme and mortal dangers.

The first British troops arrived in Athens on March 4, 1941.

It was now reasonable to contend that the spreading

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4. Kotzias, K., Greece, War and Glory. pp. 213-14, 387.





of the war in the Balkans would not be delayed for a long time. The Greek Government's policy, in the event of a German intervention, was clearly determined. Having already sided with Great Britain as a de-fact ally, Greece was bound to shape her course in accordance with that alliance -- that is, to offer unrelenting opposition to Germany and refuse to come to any unilateral understanding with her.

Involved as she already was in the struggle with Italy in Albania, Greece could not but find herself in a very unfavorable military situation, in the event of a German or combined German and Bulgarian attack. She did not have the strength to cope effectively with this new opponent.<sup>5</sup>

Yugoslavia was the obvious base from which to operate in order to subdue Greece and avenge the humiliating Italian defeat in Albania.

It was on March 10, 1941, that Germany demanded Belgrade's submission to the Axis. These demands included the right of Germany to transport men and war-material through the country. Despite violent protest from the majority of the Serb population, the Government decided not to resist but to surrender. Early on the morning of March 27, however, a revolt broke out in Belgrade which resulted in the overthrow of the ministers who had signed the pact with Germany. The young King Peter formed a new government.

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5. Papagos, Alexander, -The German Attack on Greece. pp. 5,6.

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At 5.30 o'clock the German Minister to Athens, Viktor Prinz Zu Erbach Schonberg, presented a note to the Greek Government announcing, "German troops will enter Greece at 6 A.M. to force the withdrawal of the British forces. Any opposition will be crushed."<sup>6</sup> The German High Command announced that since Yugoslav and British troops had advanced against them, it had been necessary to "counterattack".

The Nazi Army invaded Yugoslavia on April 6 and Belgrade was subjected to heavy aerial bombardment. Simultaneously the enemy advanced to the river Struma and crossed to the Grecian frontier.<sup>7</sup> The breaking of the Yugoslav front left the flank of the Greek Army defending Macedonia and Thrace in a hopeless situation, because the Germans were in a position to outflank it, as they did.

As usual the announcement of intention to attack came after the attack. At 5.15 A.M. the Germans struck.

The Greeks had tasted the fruit of valor; they answered not only with gunfire but with taunts and with determination.

King George II said to his people:

"All together men, women, and children of Hellenes, rise up, clench your fists, stand at my side...Forward sons of Hellas in the fight for body and soul."<sup>8</sup>

The German strength was far superior to that of the

6. Kotzia, K., - Greece, War and Glory. pp.343-44.

7. Ingram, Kenneth, - Year of Crisis. An outline of International History. pp.282-3.

8. Time Magazine. April 14, 1941. p.25, col.1-2.

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8. Time Magazine, April 14, 1941, p. 25, col. 1-2.  
 9. History, pp. 282-3.  
 10. A. J. A. - Germany, War and Glory, pp. 343-44.  
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defenders and the Germans were able to break through the British lines after three days of hard fighting. But the fiercest stage of this campaign was yet to be fought. By May the Germans were attacking Crete in full force. The British troops were defeated and evacuated on May 31, 1941.

Greece, by her resistance against the Axis forces, altered the course of the war. Her resistance gave England six extra months and this enabled her to accumulate more American war-materials. She also contributed to the weakening of Italy.

The projected German campaign to the East and the assault upon Russia was necessarily delayed for many months during which the Germans rushed to the assistance of the discredited and confused Italians. Greece was of inestimable value to Britain in the Near East. By forcing the Germans to take unexpected and unwanted action, she completely upset German plans on the Russian front and Near East (Egypt-Iraq) for the time being.

#### Formation Of Pro-German Governments

The main body of the Greek Army had begun to retreat within two or three days after the German attack. On the same day that the Germans took Jannina, General George Tsolakoglou, commanding the Greek Army of Epirus, surrendered all the forces under his command. With this surrender the main body

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of the Greek Army acknowledged defeat.

On April 29, 1941, a puppet government was formed in Athens under General Tsolakoglou, a quisling Army officer, who had left the Army in disgrace in 1922 after abandoning his unit during the retreat from Asia Minor. He was reinstated in 1927.

General Tsolakoglou accepted the "New Order" and urged the Greek people to adapt themselves quickly to "the new realities". "Greece can have confidence in her own future provided she shows that she understands that Greece's place is beside the Axis Powers in the struggle they have undertaken for Europe and for culture."<sup>9</sup>

The Greek people hated and feared the Germans and Bulgarians. Remembering the glories of the Albanian campaign, they despised the Italians who strutted as conquerors before the Greek people.

Nevertheless, during the first year of occupation the spirit of resistance found little expression in Greece. The people must have been rather stunned by the suddenness of their disaster. From the dizzy excitement inspired by their success against the Italians, they found themselves reduced to, what seemed, hopeless subjugation. Nearly all Greeks turned despairingly to the immediate task of keeping alive.

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9. Donauzeitung, Belgrade, 11/12/41. Taken from the British Library File, British Information Office, New York, N. Y.

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The summer of 1942 saw the beginning of effective resistance to the Axis occupation in Greece. Small bands appeared in the hills, performed various acts of sabotage and attacked isolated Italian and German soldiers.

As time went on the guerrilla forces steadily waned in power and numbers and the prestige and authority of the Quisling Government waned in proportion. By degrees many of the ordinary services in the countryside disappeared. Schools went first, for the schoolmasters were a group generally sympathetic to the resistance bands. Police power weakened more slowly but by mid-1943 the gendarmerie of the Greek Government dared not travel over large areas of the land and its members remained in the relatively large concentrations near the towns and along the main roads.

As the strength and the prestige of the resistance groups grew, the Quisling Government faced a growing moral crisis.

General Tsolakoglou continued to hold the post of Prime Minister until December 1942. He was then replaced by Constantine Logothetopoulos, a distinguished doctor and former Rector of the University of Athens.

During the winter of 1942 the economic system of Greece was completely "reorganized" by Germany with the collaboration of Kotzamanis, but the growing unrest of the Greek workers against the proposed civil mobilization,





which culminated in the general strike on March 6 - 9, 1943, forced the resignation of Logothetopoulos. His place was taken by Ioannis Rallis.

Rallis was a well-known but little liked and respected political figure in Athens. Son of Demetrius Rallis, who was several times Prime Minister, he held a short-lived ministerial appointment under his father in 1920, in the Gounaris Government in 1921, and the Tsaldaris Government of 1932 - 1933.<sup>10</sup>

During Rallis' administration the underground movement became strongly organized. One of the two major groups, the so-called E.A.M. (National Liberation Front), which was originally established as far back as September 27, 1941, was composed of a coalition of six parties.

This coalition however, most reliable observers believed, was under the control of the extreme left and this control was never seriously challenged for, of the other parties comprising the organization, three were indistinguishable from the Communists except in name, and the two remaining independent groups were relatively weak and undisciplined.<sup>11</sup>

Since the propaganda of E.A.M. was couched in broad

10. D.N.B. 7/4/43. Taken from the British Library File British Information Office, New York, N. Y.

11. Hadsel, W. N., American Policy Toward Greece, Foreign Policy Reports, September 1, 1947, p.151.





patriotic terms, and many of its conspicuous leaders were non-communists, the organization was soon highly successful in gaining widespread popular support, even among groups which had opposed the communists before the war. Efficient local organizers established E.A.M. cells in nearly every village of Greece by the spring of 1942.

Spokesmen for the movement carried on vigorous propaganda, stressing patriotic unity and hopes for improved social and economic conditions after the war, and they met with particularly enthusiastic response among the youth.<sup>12</sup>

Everybody was only too happy to know that in Greece the spirit of liberty was not dead and that after this war against two mighty Empires the Greek body lay prostrate, but the Greek soul was undaunted. All helped the movement. Young enlisted with the blessings of their parents. They enlisted in such numbers that the overflow of conspirators in the towns and villages against the enemy gradually formed an army of resistance in the mountains.

This army of the E.A.M. was called E.L.A.S. (Greek People's Liberation Army).<sup>13</sup>

The military organization E.L.A.S. grew from a mere handful of men in the spring of 1942 to a force of approxi-

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12. Ibid, p. 151.

13. Terrorism in Greece, p. 35. Published by "The Pan Hellenic Corporation of the Victims of the Communists and E.L.A.S. Activities", Athens, Greece, 1945 (Greek Text).





mately 20,000 by the following year. Part of this growth was traceable to the determination of E.L.A.S. leaders to establish a monopoly of armed resistance and their opposition--which sometimes took the form of military measures--to all belated efforts of non-communists to form independent guerrilla bands.<sup>14</sup>

However, at least part of E.L.A.S.'s success was attributable to Britain's policy during 1942-1943 of extending aid to Greek guerrilla forces purely on the basis of their numbers for, as its membership grew, E.L.A.S. became the recipient of approximately eighty per cent of the Allied weapons and supplies sent to the Greek underground.<sup>15</sup>

The British sent in some supplies and weapons by air but, more important, they sent large sums of gold which were used to buy food and other necessities for the guerrilla soldiers.

During the first year the British treated the E.L.A.S. and Zervas equally. But at the end when the Germans were forced to abandon Greece, the E.A.M.-E.L.A.S. failed to retain its virtual monopoly of the underground movement, largely due to the fact of the sudden reversal of British foreign policy

14. Hadsel, Winifred N., American Policy towards Greece. Foreign Policy Report, September 1, 1947, p. 151.

15. McNeil, W. H., The Greek Dilemma, cited p. 78.

16. Zervas was the leader of a small guerrilla band, loyal to the legal Greek Government-in-Exile.





towards the resistance movements of Greece.

During the summer of 1943 the British became dissatisfied with the aid rendered by E.L.A.S. General Headquarters, in carrying out an Allied-ordered campaign of sabotage, began to suspect that the movement's high command was primarily interested in keeping its armed forces intact in order to establish a new post-war political regime under communist leadership.

The communists never believed in their patriotic pretensions. They preached patriotism as a means of political expediency to gain the support of the Greek people and to stimulate their love for their country. Their real purpose was the serving of their fanatic ideas so blindly, to the point of committing treasonable acts.

On July 12, 1943, John Ioannides, one of the old and leading revolutionists of Greece, at present Vice-President of the so-called "Democratic Government of General Markos", and Dousan Daskalof, representing the Bulgarian Communist party, signed the Petritsi Agreement. The following articles of the above agreement show beyond any doubt that their fanaticism and blindness led them to betray their own country whose defense they so shamefully pretended was the aim of their organization.

Articles 4 and 6 read:

#4. "Bulgaria shall be given a territorial outlet to the Aegean."





#6. "Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian Macedonia, that is the territory included between the river Nestos, Mount Rodope, Ryla mountains and Osnikop Sar (Skardos) to the north, the Albanian Alps and Pindus to the West, Mt. Olympus and the Aegean including the island of Thasos to the South, shall constitute an independent autonomous Soviet Republic, within the Balkan USSR."<sup>17</sup>

When, therefore, E.L.A.S. openly defied British orders to give up armament acquired at the moment of Italy's surrender in September 1943, Britain quickly cut off supplies to the communist-led guerrillas and began to build up the Greek Democratic National League (EDES) under the command of General Mapoleon Zervas, a much smaller guerrilla band, operating in isolated area of Western Greece, as a possible rival force.

However, since EDES lacked an effective political organization and depended primarily on the personal following of Napoleon Zervas, it proved incapable of developing into a popular movement strong enough to serve as a pro-British counterbalance to EAM.

Within a month of the Italian surrender in September 1943 and before the British had finished building up Zervas's strength, ELAS attempted to eliminate the EDES army completely. The leftists accused Zervas of having violated the guerrilla charter (an understanding among them), which

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17. The Conspiracy Against Greece. June 1947  
Greek Under-Secretariat for Press and Informations, p. 11.





had been signed during the summer, and proceeded to attack him. Open civil war resulted.

Strengthened by the captured ammunition and weapons from the surrendered Italians, ELAS was able to drive Zervas back towards the Adriatic Sea.<sup>18</sup>

On February 12, 1944, representatives from ELAS Headquarters, from the British and American mission, and from Zervas met at the Plaka Bridge over the Arakthos River. There the following agreements were signed on February 29, 1944:

1. The cessation of all warfare between the forces ELAS-EDES.
2. For a more effective and coordinated opposition to the conqueror, the High Commands of the two Organizations in Epirus (EAM-EDES) should immediately formulate common plans for both aggressive and defensive purposes and the possible disposition of the forces of each Organization according to the needs of future military enterprises.
3. The Allied Military Mission was requested to communicate the wish of the Greek Fighting Forces to the Allied Military Authorities of the Near East, for more equipment and supplies which could be possibly sent to Greece.<sup>19</sup>

In the meantime, in the fall of 1943, after the capitulation of Italy, the unscrupulous and treasonable acts of the Quisling Authorities of Greece increased.

18. McNeil, W. H., -The Greek Dilemma, pp. 106-7

19. Pyromaglou, K., -The National Resistance Movement. Athens 1947, pp.263-264.





The fall of Italy caused a shortage of German manpower. This shortage led the Germans to the organizing of the so-called Security Battalions. These battalions were commanded by a few Greek pro-German regular army officers, but each unit had attached to it a German liaison officer who was in practice the battalion commander. The Security Battalions were organized all over Greece to fight the guerrillas.

These Praetorian troops served and carried out faithfully the orders of the Germans and the puppet Government of Rallis. They were used by the Quisling Government of John Rallis, not only to fight the extreme Left, but every loyal and patriotic Greek who happened to be the opponent of the pro-German regime and whose only crime was his unwillingness to sell his soul to the ruthless and barbarous conqueror.

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The EAM Showed Its Real Aspirations by Provoking an Armed Resistance Against the Legally Established Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt

Unfortunately the Plaka Bridge Agreement did not live up to the expectations of the masses of the Greek people.

The two fighting factions did not trust each other. From that time onward Zervas kept his two best "divisions" on his landward frontier as guard against a second ELAS attack; and ELAS reciprocated, stationing strong detachments in border villages.<sup>20</sup>

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20. McNeil, W. H., -The Greek Dilemma, p. 108





The EAM was resolved to prevent the return of King George II to Greece. Accordingly, in March 1944, EAM set up a provisional Government of its own, known as the Political Committee for National Liberation, or PEEA. The first President of the Committee was Colonel Evripides Bakirdgis, succeeded in April by Professor Alexander Svolos. They were no more than figureheads. The real power was concentrated in the hands of a few Communist leaders, chief among them George Siantos, the Secretary of the Interior in the "Cabinet".

As far back as July 4, 1943 King George of Greece, in a radio address from Cairo to the Greek people, said:

"...as soon as our country is liberated, and when conditions should improve as to secure free and unfettered elections for the creation of a Constitutional Assembly, I assure you that these elections are going to be held within six months from the time of our country's liberation, I am sincerely convinced that no Greek, including myself will refuse to abide by the decisions of such a body..."<sup>21</sup>

In spite of King George's speech, the political parties of Greece,<sup>22</sup> in regard to the King's return, tied up their policies with those of the communists.

On August 10, 1943, representatives of the three principal guerrilla organizations of Greece reached Cairo through means furnished by British Army authorities.

George Exindaris, official representative of political parties which existed in the 1936 Chamber, held the same view

21. Tsouderos, Em., -Greek Unrests in the Middle East, pp.59-60.

22. Political Parties: Liberal, Progressive, Democratic, Socialists....





on the dynasty question and on August 17, 1943, he and the resistance representatives signed a joint letter to Premier Tsouderos in which they declared that:

"...For the sake of national unity, which alone can assure the success of the national struggle and the normal development of the political life of the country, it is necessary that an authoritative statement be issued that the King will not return to Greece before the people have given their decision on the form of their regime."<sup>23</sup>

On receipt of this letter, the Cabinet informed the King that it agreed unanimously with the views expressed in the letter.

The King was of the opinion that in such a fundamental issue, the advice of the Allied Governments would be necessary, because the whole problem affected Greece's part in the war. He decided to consult the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States.

On August 26, 1943, Winston Churchill sent him a telegram upon his request. Among other things, Churchill said:

"...the opinion of His Majesty's Government is that the pronouncements which the King had made on July 4 was the only one which could serve the best interests of Greece..."<sup>24</sup>

The President of the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in answering the King's telegram, defined the attitude of his Government. The President said:

"I sincerely hope, and this for the sake

23. Ibid., pp.63-64.

24. Ibid., p.67.





of a united effort for the carrying on of an effective fight against our common enemies, that all the Greeks will accept the program of their King, as had been given to them on July 4. The first and immediate task should be the liberation of their country..."<sup>25</sup>

On October 15, 1943, Anthony Eden, on his way to Moscow through Cairo, discussed with Premier Tsouderos Greece's international and internal problems.

Mr. Eden expressed his satisfaction with the prevailing conditions in Greece. He was of the opinion that the Greeks were resisting the Germans effectively and resolutely.

In discussing the constitutional problems of Greece and the question of the King's return, Mr. Eden hinted, beyond any doubt, where he stood. He told Tsouderos that the King ought to agree with the expressed wish of the Greek Nation not to return before the Greek people decided through a specially held plebiscite.<sup>26</sup>

On November 8, 1943, under the light of these new developments, in a letter to Mr. Tsouderos, King George wrote:

"...I have reconsidered the whole internal problem, since my last pronouncement of July 4th, and decided not to return to Greece before the people expressed their wish upon it. In the meantime I intend to remain their King trying, by every possible means at my disposal, to protect and promote the national aspirations of the country..."<sup>27</sup>

All the Greek political parties, with the exception

25. Ibid., p.68.

26. Ibid., p.70.

27. Ibid., pp.72-73.





of EAM, expressed their satisfaction with the King's new attitude. This was done through a letter sent to Prime Minister Tsouderos in Cairo. The letter, dated January 19, 1944, bore the names of such prominent and influential political leaders as Themistokles Sophoulis (present Prime Minister), representing the Liberal Party, Petros Rallis of the Royalist Party, George Papandreou of the Social Democratic Party, and others.

Nevertheless, King George's letter did not terminate the constitutional problem of Greece.

The political parties of Greece, distrustful of the King's pre-war policy in Greece, asked him to have a statement signed that under no circumstances would he return to his throne before the Greek people called him back. The King felt rather offended by this demand and refused to sign such a statement. The President of the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, agreed with the King and came to his defense.

These new developments created a political crisis within the Greek Government-in-exile. The Prime Minister Emmanouel Tsouderos threatened that he would submit his resignation. But Mr. Tsouderos did not resign his position due to the friendly advice of the Allied Governments.

Finally Great Britain, King George, and the Greek Government-in-exile agreed to send a representative from Cairo to Athens to see all the political factions of Greece, and the Archbishop of Athens, Damaskinos, to try once more the pacification of the Greek political problem through consultation with





their political leaders.

However, the political leaders brought forth new demands. All groups that were consulted, including the Communists, demanded that Damaskinos, Metropolitan of Athens and Archbishop of Greece, should be the Regent. On March 8, 1944, Prime Minister Tsouderos communicated this new demand to the King and suggested that he sign a decree in secret nominating Damaskinos, his temporary representative in Greece.<sup>28</sup>

The King's reaction was a categorical refusal to such a plan because he was of the opinion that a question of honor was involved, a trespass upon his constitutional prerogatives, and that the political parties were trying to undermine his throne.

The question now arises: are the political parties in Greece to blame for this impasse; were they justified in bringing up so many demands?

It is not denying that the parties showed a distrustful attitude towards the King. They were supersensitive about the whole problem.

If we look back we will see that the King was the same person who arbitrarily abused his constitutional authority in 1936; established another dictatorship in Europe; sent the parties underground. You cannot but sympathize with the views of the political parties in the above question.

However, this does not mean that the political parties

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Ibid., p.68.





were fully justified in their attitude. Certain considerations should have taken place before adopting such an irreconcilable and stubborn attitude towards the whole problem. We were fighting the greatest war in history of mankind. Such diversions should have been avoided as much as possible.

Unfortunately, the political parties in Greece were blind with ambitions and lacked wise statesmanship. The blindness was properly exploited by the Communists to serve their own aims. This meant undermining the existence of those political parties themselves.

The reaction to the King's refusal was not delayed. EAM became convinced that strong measures would be necessary to prevent the King's return, and proceeded to set up the Provisional Government in the mountains in deliberate defiance of the royal amigré Government. A minority, well organized and with the characteristic discipline of the communist parties, decided upon violence and force to seize the political authority in Greece, and for the establishment of a dictatorial totalitarian regime.

On April 6, a Greek Brigade and a large proportion of the Greek navy mutinied. The Greek Brigade was encircled by British forces some thirty miles away from Alexandria, and Greek ships which had mutinied in Alexandria Harbor were lying under the guns of both shore batteries and superior British Naval forces. After more than three weeks tension, Greek Vice-





Admiral Petros Voulgaris ended the mutiny.<sup>29</sup>

It was emphasized that all the fighting was done by Greek personnel loyal to the Government. Nevertheless, the British warships gave silent but important psychological backing in the restoration of discipline.

The international repercussions of this mutiny were immediate and divergent.

The Soviet Government, naturally, had a word of approval. On April 10, 1944, the official news agency, Tass, reported that the Tsouderos Government had detained in concentration camps in Palestine and Tripolitania more than 1,000 Greek soldiers who opposed its policy.<sup>30</sup>

True or not, this could be interpreted as an indirect attack upon the Greek Government-in-exile and showed beyond doubt that the Soviet Government was morally, if not actively, behind the Greek insurgents.

The attitude of the United States towards the revolt and its approval of the way the British Government handled the whole problem is manifested by a message sent by Roosevelt to Winston Churchill.

The message reads as follows:

"Thank you for the information regarding the recent difficulties encountered in the Greek participation in our allied efforts. I join with you in the hope

29. New York Times, May 25, 1944, 12:1 (House of Commons Debates May 24, 1944).

30. New York Times, April 11, 1944. (6:3).





that your line of action towards the problem may be successful in bringing the Greeks back into the Allied camp and in participation against the Barbarians. That will be worthy of the traditions established by the heroes of Greek history.... I am unhappy over the present situation and hope that Greeks everywhere will set aside pettiness and regain their sense of proportion. Let every Greek think of his glorious past and show a personal unselfishness which is necessary now."<sup>31</sup>

Prime Minister Tsouderos, who had been Premier since the few days before Greece's evacuation, resigned on account of disorders,<sup>32</sup> and he was succeeded on April 7, by Sophocles Venizelos.

Venizelos remained Premier only until April 23, when he was replaced by George Papandreou.

On April 23, Papandreou succeeded Sophocles Venizelos as Prime Minister of the Greek Government. He came to power with the program of uniting all parties and resistance organizations in support of a coalition Government. This idea had been current in Cairo before his arrival, and the Venizelos Government had issued formal invitations to the parties and organizations in Greece to come to a conference in the Middle East. Such a conference, it was hoped by both British and Greeks, could be able to resolve the quarrels that threatened to break out into bloodshed upon the Germans' departure.

31. New York Times, - May 2, 1944 (8:5).

32. New York Times, - April 4, 1944 p. 9:1.





## CHAPTER II

### The Formation of a Greek National Government

Venizelos failed to quell the mutiny. The British Embassy began to look around for another prime minister. They found him in George Papandreou, leader of the Social Democratic Party. Papandreou came to the Near East, after having been invited by the British Government.<sup>1</sup> He had held various positions in various governments. Politically he was considered liberal and mildly socialist. He was not a member of the EAM.

Mr. Papandreou after he arrived in Egypt said that the formation of the so-called "Committee of Five" under Bakirdzis constituted an "act of division".<sup>2</sup>

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1. McNeil, W.H., - The Greek Dilemma. p.136.

2. New York Times, - April 17, 1944. p.11:1.





Ending a policy of drift and vacillation that had become the breeding ground of mutiny and civil war, Prime Minister Churchill addressed a firm message on April 30, 1944 to the new Greek Premier, Mr. Papandreou.

In this message Churchill pledged "all support" to the Greek King and his new government in their "supreme task and duty of directing all Greek forces against the common foe", until the Nazi tyrant had been crushed.

He ruled out any internal dissensions until after the war when, in reasonable tranquillity and free from foreign interference, the Greek nation might choose the kind of Democratic Government under which it would want to live. The choice, he declared, will also determine whether Greece is to be a monarchy or a republic. But in the meantime it is the King who, having begun a victorious war against Italy, must also fight through the end of the war against Germany and "no one has the constitutional right to stand between him and his duty". Mr. Churchill concluded, "we will judge against Greek of any class and party accordingly as they help to rescue the soil of Greece from the Hitlerite foe."

Furthermore, this message was dispatched immediately after the conference between the British Government and the United States under-secretary of state, Stettinius, which, in the words of the official communiqué, "revealed a very large measure of common ground", and produced "great satisfaction" all around and must therefore be regarded as expressing a com-





mon Anglo-American policy.<sup>43</sup>

The importance of this message was that the British Government put the national struggle of Greece against Nazi Germany above all the political, social, and economic quarrels.

In other words the British Government was an ally of Greece in waging war, not the ally of any Greek factions in staging a revolution that interfered with the war. British policy clearly indicated that, although it hoped for a complete compromise among all factions, it would not tolerate dictation over the others by EAM.

The American policy did not permit the backing of any factions and was purely moral in its effect, since the Eastern Mediterranean had obviously been a British sphere of influence but it was evident that the State Department was inclined to look with equal disfavor on any EAM aspirations to control Greece.

Russia, on the other hand, had for the first time, evinced a definite interest in the Greek affairs and, through her press and radio, she had indicated her support of the EAM. Russia had also indicated her sympathy with the mutineers and attacked many loyal factions as "fascists" in her propaganda.<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Papandreou, as soon as he took office as Prime Minister of Greece, made the following statement:

"I wish to repeat again the statement which

3. New York Times, -May 1, 1944, (14:1).

4. Ibid., -April 27, 1944 (8:4).





I had made a few days ago upon my arrival to Cairo that the first task and all my efforts would be devoted toward the formation of National Government in which all the political parties and all the political fighting organizations will participate...."<sup>5</sup>

After the necessary preliminary negotiations it was decided that a conference be held at Lebanon.

Representatives of all the Greek political parties and all the fighting organizations including EAM sent their delegates. The National Unity Conference was opened on May 17. Altogether twenty-five delegates were present representing the politicians of Cairo and nearly all the parties and resistance organizations of Greece.

EAM was represented by six men of whom one was a communist. The head of the EAM delegation was Alexander Svolos, formerly professor of constitutional law in the University of Athens.

By May 20, a so-called "National Charter" had been accepted and signed by the delegates, who represented all political parties and resident groups.<sup>6</sup>

The provisions called:

- 1) The reorganization and the disciplining of the Greek armed forces in the Middle East under the flag of the Greek Nation.
- 2) The unification and disciplining of all guerrilla bodies in free Greece as well as mobilization against the conquerors of all the nation's fighting forces

5. Papandreou, G., -The Liberation of Greece. p.40.

6. New York Times, -May 22, 1944, (5:1).





under the order of the Unity Government.

- 3) The end of terrorism in the Greek countryside and ensuring of personal security and the political liberties of the people, when and where the conqueror shall withdraw.
- 4) Ensuring in the near future, at the time of the liberation of our country, in common with the allies, the order and liberty of the Greek people, so that they may be free from any economic and psychological coercion, to decide as a sovereign people, their political regime, their social regime and a government of their choice.
- 5) The severe punishment of all traitors and exploiters of the people's misery. Etc...<sup>7</sup>

After the conclusion of the conference, the Government returned to Cairo and the representatives of the liberal and other parties were duly inducted into the cabinet.

The EAM delegation, however, returned to Greece in order to secure ratification of its decision, so that, for the time being, no representatives of the Left joined the Government of National Unity.<sup>8</sup>

The greatest question was EAM; would or would not the leftist representatives join the cabinet and participate in the Government? When Svolos and his fellow delegates returned to Greece from Lebanon, at least some of the leaders of EAM felt that they had come away with a bad bargain.

In a desperate effort to persuade the left wing EAM and its guerrilla army inside occupied Greece to cooperate in

7. Papandreou, G., - The Liberation of Greece, pp 59-67 and National Liberation Front (EAM) White Book, pp. 1-4.

8. McNeill, W.H., - The Greek Dilemma, p.141.





achieving complete national unity, Premier Papandreou appealed by radio, on June 28, to collaborate on things decided at the Lebanon meeting or face the consequences.<sup>9</sup>

After a long delay and much impatience on the part of the Cabinet the EAM's terms were received July 4. They are reported to have insisted that, to collaborate with the Government, the following must be agreed upon:

1. An official amnesty for all ELAS and EAM members.
2. Concession of important cabinet posts to EAM members, including the War Ministry.
3. Assumption of control of the guerrilla movement in Greece by the ELAS.
4. Continuance of the ELAS as the recognized guerrilla organization.<sup>10</sup>

These demands were in violation of the National Charter signed at Lebanon. Their acceptance by the other political parties would mean the undermining of the idea of a national government as had been contemplated at Lebanon.

The Greek Cabinet felt that these new demands would give the EAM a dominating position and therefore it was impossible to accept.<sup>11</sup>

The Premier reiterated a statement made at the Lebanon Conference "...that our people do not discriminate between their tyrants; they reject tyranny in any form." The supplementary protocol "...upon which the EAM insisted," the Premier

9. New York Times, June 29, 1944, p. 4:5

10. Ibid., July 6, 1944, p. 3:8

11. Ibid., July 6, 1944, p. 3:8





said, "means the immediate formation of an EAM government in the mountains, an army belonging to the EAM, EAM control of the gendarmerie and police, the administration of justice and the inspiration of education by the EAM." In short, he said, "It means the nation's submission" to a group held to be but a small minority alleged already waning in popularity within Greece due, largely, to the EAM's sponsoring of the recent mutiny in the armed forces.<sup>12</sup>

The failure of EAM to honor pledges given by its delegates at the recent Conference at Lebanon and to take part in a Greek National Government had been a great disappointment to all, including Greece's Allies.

Mr. Anthony Eden, in a speech in the House of Commons on July 27, 1944, defined the policy of the English Government towards the Greek political problem in the light of the latest developments.

Among other things, Mr. Eden said that the leaders of EAM who had remained in Greece during the Conference had done more than refused their cooperation to Mr. Papandreou; they had put forward "fresh and unreasonable demands, the effect of which would be to give them control over all the Greek guerrilla forces and over the Greek Army abroad, and a representation in the Greek Government out of all proportion to their actual strength."

12. Papandreou, G., The Liberation of Greece, pp. 92-105





It is believed that the opponents of cooperation represented only a portion, perhaps not even a majority, of this organization. When allowance had been made for all extenuating circumstances, the policy of EAM was to aid no one but the German and the Bulgar.

The Government, which at the Lebanon Conference their representatives undertook to join, was headed by a man of liberal record whose purposes were manifestly disinterested.

It was a government solely designed to secure that unity which was the paramount need if Greece was to play her part in victory and secure her full fruits. It was a provisional Government that would endure only until it could surrender its mandate to the Greek people and give way to an elected and fully representative successor. No reason could be valid for failing to promote, still less for thwarting an authentic and indispensable national movement with which every hope of liberation was bound.<sup>13</sup>

On August 2, Prime Minister Winston Churchill reiterated in the House of Commons that "His Majesty's Government approves Mr. Eden's policy towards Greece." Mr. Churchill was also determined to ask the House of Commons for a vote of confidence."<sup>14</sup>

In the meantime the United States Ambassador recom-

13. London Times, July 7, 1944, p. 5:3.

14. London Times, August 3, 1944, p. 5:3.





mended repeatedly to the representatives of Eam the need for their participation in a Government of National Unity, according to the decisions taken at Lebanon.

Even the Soviet Government, through its Embassy at Cairo, advised Mr. Angelopoulos to convey its wish to the leaders of EAM for the formation of a Government of National Unity under Mr. Papandreou with EAM participating.<sup>15</sup>

The long-awaited communication from the EAM to the Greek Government in Cairo contained, as a sole condition under which the EAM and other affiliated left-wing organizations would agree to cooperate, the message that George Papandreou resign the premiership.

The demand was considered at an all-day Cabinet meeting and was rejected unanimously. However, Mr. Papandreou said,

"In no case would the person of the Premier be allowed to form an obstacle to achievement of National Unity."<sup>16</sup>

With Mr. Papandreou ousted the government's solidarity would be impaired. Under weaker leadership EAM would have a better chance of achieving its ends.

In August 21, 1944 Mr. Churchill met Greek Premier George Papandreou in Italy. With him he reviewed every aspect of the Greek situation. It was officially stated that they found themselves in complete agreement.

15. Papandreou, G., - The Liberation of Greece. p.106.

16. New York Times, August 7, 1944. p.4:4.





In particular, Mr. Churchill expressed the satisfaction of the British Government at the progress made by the Greeks in achieving national unity; he also discussed with Mr. Papandreou the means by which the Greek military effort against the Germans could be most effective.<sup>17</sup>

After Mr. Papandreou's return from Italy, the leadership of the EAM withdrew its demand for his resignation and decided to participate in a Government of National Unity such as had been decided at Lebanon. This reversal of policy was probably influenced by the pledge of full support given by the Allied governments to the Papandreou Government.

Accordingly, five men were chosen as Ministers, two of them Communists and the others drawn from the Socialist wing of the movement. They arrived in Cairo September 1, and were sworn in the next day.

The decision of EAM to join the Papandreou Government coincided with the arrival of a Russian Military Mission in the Greek mountains. The leadership of EAM was predominantly Communist, and perhaps Moscow had influenced this decision, this temporary truce, for reasons of political expediency.

A few excerpts from the newspaper "Democratia" of October 7, 1944, No. 25, (True copy found in the Communist Archives at Boula, suburb of Athens) show beyond any doubt, that the EAM was of bad faith and was trying to undermine the

17. London Times, -August 24, 1944. p.3:5.





National Government from within.

The excerpts from the agreement, signed by the EAM and the Bulgarian Communist Party in September 12, 1944, read as follows:

"...The hour of the realization of our aim is nigh. The Petritsi agreement, which was signed by our comrade Yannis Ioannidis of the Communist Party of Greece and by comrade Dousan Daskalov of the Communist Party of Bulgaria on July 12, 1943 is to be enforced. Our protector, Stalin, shall seek, according to this agreement, to bring all his children up to the Mt. Olympus within the lap of mother Slavia..." and

"...Fight the traitor Zervas, the Security Battalions, the rich, the merchants,-- fight them all so that they may not conclude an alliance with the Germans and stop the union of all the proletarians on both sides of the frontier..."<sup>18</sup>

This of course constitutes an infamous act of treason; it shows how political fanaticism can make some distorted and twisted people betray their own country to the extent of agreeing to its dismemberment.

One of the stipulations of the Lebanon agreement provided for a united and coordinated effort on the part of all the Greeks for the liberation of their country at the earliest possible date.

Here again is part of an agreement signed by Captain Kitsos of the EAM and Major Erich Fenske of the German Army in Greece. The agreement was concluded at Leivadi on September

18. The Conspiracy Against Greece, Greek Under-Secretariat for Press and Information. June, 1947. pp. 14-15.





1, 1944.

The Agreement reads:

"The undersigned Captain Kitsos, commander of the Second Battalion of the 31st ELAS Regiment, acting as representative of OMM, (Group of Macedonian divisions) being so authorized by the Commander of the XIth Division and Major Erich Fenske, Commander of the Unit 31756 at Vasiliko, representing the German armed forces of the army of the Aegean, having met today, the first of September 1944, in the village of Leivadi, in the area of Salonica, has agreed to the following:"

"...ELAS undertakes the obligation not to impede the withdrawal of the German Army in the area of OMM which will enter each evacuated sector after the departure of the last German soldier..."

"...ELAS bears no responsibility whatever if anti-popular treacherous groups should attack German forces..."

"...German Supreme Military Command will hand over to ELAS heavy weapons and corresponding war material for the liquidation of any such group as mentioned above..."

"...On these conditions, and with the collaboration of the Bulgarian and Albanian partisan units, ELAS undertakes to fight against anti-popular guerrilla groups, that is to say, all forces who are determined to continue the fight against the Germans..."<sup>19</sup>

During the Churchill - Papandreou meeting in Italy, the British Prime Minister suggested to Mr. Papandreou the removal of the Greek Government from Cairo to Italy. This suggestion was accepted with alacrity by Mr. Papandreou and the rest of the members of the Greek Cabinet.

19. The Conspiracy Against Greece, Greek Under-Secretariat for Press and Information. June, 1947. pp. 15-16.





As early as September, in accordance with this agreement, the Greek Government transferred its seat to Salerno, Italy, where it was effectually divorced from the talkative Greek colony of Cairo and subject to no outside pressures save that of British military advice. The great task was to get ready for liberation. Members of the Cabinet were detailed to go to various outlying parts of the country that had already been freed of the Germans. The main body of the Cabinet, however, with Prime Minister Papandreou and the EAM Ministers, remained in Italy.<sup>20</sup>

On September 26, 1944, when the liberation of Greece seemed imminent, all the Greek political factions represented in the Papandreou Government and the British High Command of the Mediterranean area signed the Caserta Agreement.

This agreement was signed by General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, former Allied supreme commander in the Mediterranean; Mr. Harold MacMillan, British Minister, resident in the Middle East; Mr. Papandreou the Greek Minister; General Sarafis, Commander of ELAS; and General Zervas, Commander of EDES. General Scobie and the EAM ministers, Mr. Svolos and General Zervas, were present.

By this agreement, the guerrilla forces in Greece. "acknowledged the headship of Papandreou's Government" and "that Government in turn put all the Greek forces at its dis-

20. McNeill, W.H., - The Greek Dilemma, p.147.





posal under the command of General Scobie, as representative of all Allied High Command in Greece." It was further agreed that "the guerrilla forces would not make any attempt to seize power at the time of liberation" but, "would form a national union between themselves through which to coordinate their activities against the enemy." It was also expressly stated that "the security Battalions were not a part of the forces under the Greek Government but were enemy formations".<sup>21</sup>

Such then was the political situation when the Germans at last abandoned Athens, and the Greek Government was able to return to its long-lost city.

The Government arrived in Athens on October 18, 1944. British troops had landed in Greece three weeks earlier, coming ashore on the mainland first at Patras. Several small skirmishes took place between the advance guard of the British force and the tail of the German column. Zervas harassed the German retreat through Epirus and assaulted Jannina before the last Germans had time to escape. ELAS likewise harried the retreating Germans but devoted most of its power to destroying the remnants of the Security Battalions. As the Germans withdrew, the guerrillas came down from the hills to the towns and enjoyed the sweetness of a more civilized life than they had known in the remote villages of the back country. In some places there was a little blood-shed, notably at Kalamata in the southern

21. London Times. September 29, 1944.





Peloponnese where ELAS executed about thirty persons; but through most of Greece the guerrillas obeyed the order of General Scobie that there should be no wholesale punishment of collaborators. EAM governments were set up in all towns of the ELAS area; a special corps of ELAS took over town police duties; taxes were assessed on those who were suspected of having profited during the occupation and collected by force, if necessary. In the city of Athens there were frequent shots by night but the majority of them were fired into the air and only expressed the high spirits of the guerrilla who pressed the trigger. Peace and order were on the whole remarkably well maintained.<sup>22</sup>

After the first days of rejoicing, political tension was not slow to manifest itself. Papandreou's Government faced truly colossal difficulties and could not forget its bitter internal quarrels.

Mr. Papandreou was now determined to dissolve the guerrilla organizations and build up a regular national army.

On November 5, 1944 Mr. Papandreou made the following statement which met with the approval of General Scobie.

"After the accomplished liberation of Greece, the heroic mission of our organizations automatically ceased...", "...it is the proper course that ELAS and EDES should be demilitarized and lay down their arms by December the tenth.

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22. McNeill, W. H., -The Greek Dilemma, pp. 149-150.





A regular army should take over the safety of our country, an army belonging to no political organization but to the Greek nation as a whole."<sup>23</sup>

The Government had decided on the disarmament of guerrilla forces and on the establishment of a National Guard which was to be composed of men of military age, beginning with the class of 1936. The enrollment of the National Guard had begun and it was agreed that the officers should have the approval of the extreme Left.

According to the Greek National Radio and Mr. Papandreou, EAM then proposed that some units of the guerrilla forces should be preserved and that the ELAS units should be equal in numbers to the combined strength of Colonel Zervas' EDES, the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion (which the Government considered as the Greek regular army).<sup>24</sup>

Apparently Mr. Papandreou had difficulty in persuading the right wing party to accept the plan, but finally he was able, in the interest of national unity, to obtain their approval.

When the plan was brought before the Cabinet to be signed a Communist Minister Zevgos proposed a different plan, demanding the dissolution of the Mountain Brigade and the

23. Papandreou, G.-The Liberation of Greece, pp. 174-175

24. Foreign Policy Report, September 1, 1941, -Greece 1945-1946 War and Aftermath, Vol. 21, No. 12, p. 182.





Sacred Battalion.<sup>25</sup>

But these every-day new demands were in violation of the Lebanon and Caserta agreements. The Communists did not want a national unity. Such a unity was blocking their way to power. Being the minority, they were resolved to use every obstacle, every possible treacherous political game to accomplish their aims. What were their aims? The establishment of a ruthless and tyrannical dictatorship of the extreme Left in the name of democracy which they so badly abuse when in power. They had asked for the abolition of the regular Greek Army. But no person of good faith could misunderstand the motives behind such a demand. A defenseless country would be at their mercy. Let us not forget that 20,000 well-disciplined and organized Russian Communists took over St. Petersburg in 1917 against the will of the great majority of the Russian people. Plehanov, not Lenin or Trotsky, was the leader who represented the majority of the Russian people.

Communist parties everywhere have one aim--the seizure of political power by every possible means at their disposal.

But the Greek government decided once more to compromise with these new proposals for the sake of national u-<sup>26</sup>

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25. National Liberation Front (EAM) White Book Documents 31,33. pp. 23-24

26. Professor Stavrianos comes to a different conclusion in his article Greece: War and Aftermath. (See Foreign Policy Reports, Vol.21, No.12, Sept. 1, 1945, p.183.) However since this article was written, many documents published, and available now bring forth a different conclusion.





nity. The government appeared to have offered to send most of the units to the frontiers, but this was rejected by the extreme Left; and the crisis developed sharply when members of the ELAS and National Militia refused to hand their arms over to the National Guard.<sup>27</sup>

Why did Mr. Papandreou refuse to see the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion<sup>28</sup> dissolved? Because they constituted a part of the Regular Greek Army. Also, the war was still going on and these two military units were the only ones which were available until the organization of a regular army for participation in the common allied cause.

Faced with such a tense situation which was full of potentialities, General Scobie, on December 1, issued an order in conformity with the Caserta Agreement, of which he was one of the signatory parties, calling for disarmament of the guerilla forces.

On the same day General Scobie issued a proclamation to the Greek people declaring that British forces came to Greece to aid them in expelling the invader, in bringing relief and in restoring happiness and prosperity; that the latter goal could not be attained without establishing the authority

27. London Times, December 7, 1944.

28. Consisting of Royalists. The only Greek Army loyal to the Greek Government, established according to the Lebanon Agreement.





of the Greek Government throughout the country; that in many regions terrorism still prevailed and was hindering the distribution of relief, and that he would "stand firmly by the side of the present constitutional government until the Greek State could be reestablished with a lawful armed force at its command and until free elections could be held."<sup>29</sup>

The same day the Government issued strict orders for the handing over of arms.

On December 2, six of the representative of EAM in the Government resigned rather than sign the decree disbanding all resistance forces on December 10. EAM demonstrations were arranged. The Government judged themselves to be faced with widespread disobedience and made preparations to meet such a coup d'etat.

A central committee of the EAM was reestablished and their decision published in the official Communist paper, "Rizospastic". The committee decided that a popular demonstration should be held in Constitution Square on December 3 in defiance of the Government's orders and that a general strike should be organized for December 4. The Government forbade the demonstration because it understood that it was the beginning of a revolution.<sup>30</sup> The developments proved that the

29. National Liberation Front (EAM) White Book No. 49; also G. Papandreou, Liberation of Greece, cited pp. 172-174

30. London Times, December 8, 1944.  
Papandreou in his address to the Foreign Correspondents at Hotel Grand Bretagne.





Government was right because the demonstrators were armed. The demonstrators collided with the police in the center of Athens at Constitution Square on Sunday, December 3.

These violent events were a prelude to civil war. Indiscriminate shooting began and civil war, the greatest drama of modern Greek History, followed.

At night, the ELAS forces captured the police stations and executed their inmates.

When news of this action reached British Headquarters, orders were given to General Scobie to take over command of Athens and restore and maintain order by whatever measures were necessary.

General Ronald M. Scobie de Lared in a proclamation on December 5, 1944:

"I reiterate that, with the vast majority of Greeks, I stand firmly behind the Constitutional Government and shall aid them to the limit of my resources until the Greek State can be reestablished with lawful armed forces behind it and free elections held."

And Prime Minister Churchill, in his address to the House of Commons on December 5, 1944, said:

"Our own position, as I have said, is extremely clear. Whether the Greek people form themselves into a monarchy or republic is for their decision. Whether they form a government of the Right or Left is for their decision. These are entirely matters for them to decide. Until they are, however, in a position to decide, we shall not hesitate to use the considerable

1. New York Times, December 5, 1944.





### Chapter III.

#### The Civil War

The indiscriminate shooting that started in Constitution Square spread into civil war.

In spite of Mr. Papandreou's new appeal for national unity, the ELAS forces captured the police stations and executed their inmates.

When news of this action reached British Headquarters, orders were given to General Scobie to take over command of Athens and restore and maintain order by whatever measures were necessary.

General Ronald M. Scobie declared in a proclamation on December 5, 1944:

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1. New York Times, December 5, 1944.





British army now in Greece and, being reinforced, to see that law and order are maintained."<sup>2</sup>

In the meantime Themitocles Sophoulis, 85 year old Dean of the Greek Liberal Party, was approached by all parties including the communists and asked to form a new Government, even though the Communists knew that he did not share their views.

Mr. Papandreou offered to resign. However, he was informed by the British Ambassador that, according to his latest instructions from Prime Minister Churchill, any change at the present time of the head of the Greek Government was impossible.<sup>3</sup> There seemed little likelihood that an alternative Government could, in fact, be formed with any chance of coping with the situation.

Would a Sophoulis Government offer a better chance of reaching an agreement with EAM? Mr. Sophoulis claimed that members of many parties would serve under him but, as a matter of fact, he had for quite a while criticized Mr. Papandreou for making too many concessions to EAM. He furthermore thought that Mr. Papandreou had included too many EAM men in his cabinet. During the critical days which preceded the breakdown, Mr. Sophoulis joined with the Right Ministers, who declared that they would withdraw from the Government unless ELAS forces were disarmed by December 10. His assumption of office could,

2. New York Times, December 6, 1944, p. 4:2

3. London Times, December 6, 1944, p. 3:5





therefore, hardly be regarded as promising in itself.

When Papandreou withdrew his resignation, EAM found itself in a critical position. The whole tactical plan had gone askew. If they were to gain their end, and change the Government, then, obviously, more strenuous efforts and greater violence were required. Their problem was made no easier by an order which General Scobie issued in the name of the Greek Government early in the morning of December 4. By this order he commanded all ELAS units to withdraw from Athens and Piræus within seventy-two hours, and ordered them to desist from attacking police stations. As Allied Commander-in-Chief and duly commissioned deputy of the Greek Government, General Scobie unquestionably had the legal power to issue such orders. To defy them would mean an open break with the British Military power.

The counsels of EAM were seriously divided. The Communists were strongly in favor of continuing the battle, if necessary, even against British soldiers. They calculated that the superior number of ELAS were sufficient to overcome, not only the Right-Wing Greeks, but the British as well.

After hours of uncertainty, it was agreed that ELAS would not obey General Scobie's ultimatum to evacuate the town, which expired on the morning of December 6. The ELAS attacked the British Naval Headquarters and sharp fighting followed between ELAS forces and the British troops in





Athens.<sup>4</sup>

The drawing of British troops into the civil war aroused heartsearching in British circles and criticisms abroad which were not stilled by Mr. Churchill's defense of British policy in Parliament.

In the United States Senate there was protestation against Britain's dictation by force of arms of the choice of leaders in liberated Greece. However, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., United States Secretary of State, agreed with Mr. Churchill's statement that, whatever form of Government the Greek people chose was for their decision alone.<sup>5</sup>

Limited as this statement was, it represented American approval on one important point and therefore was of considerable value morally to the Churchill Government when it faced the House of Commons on the Greek question.

On December 8, Mr. Churchill had made it clear in the House of Commons that, unless the House gave him a vote of confidence on his policy in the liberated countries, he would resign. He received that, by a vote of 281-32.

The main body of the Labor party abstained from voting. They did not like the terms of an amendment that the Prime Minister interpreted as a challenge to his Government and they were unwilling to endorse a policy that involved

4. London Times Review of the Year 1944. January 2, 1945.

5. New York Times. December 8, 1944, p. 1:5.





British forces in a civil war in Greece.

Mr. Churchill opened his defense against the charge that British Policy was designed to support feeble reactionary Governments in Greece against "friends of Democracy".

"Democracy," he said, "is not based on violence or terrorism but on reason, on fair play, on freedom, on respecting other people's rights as well as your ambition. Democracy is not a harlot to be picked up in the streets by a man with a tommy-gun. During the war," he said, "we have had to arm anyone who could shoot a Hun. We accepted them as friends and tried to enable them to fulfill their hearty instincts... but when countries are liberated, it does not follow that those who have weapons should use them in order to engross themselves by violence and murder and bloodshed in all those powers and traditions the continuity of which many countries have fought for...."

"At the Quebec Conference it was proposed by the combined Chiefs of Staff that the British should prepare the forces to occupy the Athens area and pave the way for the commencement of relief and for the establishment of law and order and for the installment of the Greek Government, which we and the great bulk of the United Nations had formally recognized... we came, therefore, to Greece with the American and Russian consent and at the invitation of the Government of all parties bearing with us such good gifts as liberty,





order, food and the assurance of an absolute right to determine their own future when normal tranquillity was regained."<sup>6</sup>

The Prime Minister's speech had failed to satisfy his critics, including the conservative Times of London, and there was a growing demand for a conference of Mr. Churchill, Premier Stalin, and President Roosevelt to clarify Allied policy.

While a portion of the London press supported Mr. Churchill's defense of his policy, other influential elements were dissatisfied. The London Times took the view that Mr. Churchill had oversimplified the situation in putting all the blame for Greek events on Leftist extremists when "there exists at least equal justification for fear of the intentions of the Right."<sup>7</sup>

Russian newspapers had refrained from making any comments although they quoted British newspapers on the Greek situation.<sup>8</sup> Russia did not support publicly ELAS's efforts. That, no doubt, was well-planned to prove to the world that the revolt was not a Communist move but a Democratic move. However, the free Yugoslav radio (controlled then by Russia) quoted a speaker at a meeting in Belgrade as having declared, in reference to the fighting in Greece, that "we can only side

6. London Times, December 9, 1944, "Text of Prime Minister's Speech in the House of Commons."

7. London Times, December 9, 1944.

8. New York Times, December 9, 1944, p. 4:4

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with the English opposition and agree with it that England's participation in this way in Greece constitutes a blow struck at the Democratic forces in the country."<sup>9</sup>

In the United States public opinion was confused, especially as the United States had no stable policy concerning the situation in Greece.

Although the "hands off" policy in respect to the internal politics of liberated countries was stressed, still it justified Mr. Churchill's argument that the Greeks should not determine their future under the terror of an armed minority.

There could be no democratic solution of the problem of Government in Greece--as in France, Belgium, Italy, or any other liberated country--while private armies were in a position to impose their will by force.

British assistance was called intervention. However, it can hardly be called so, for intervention exists only when it takes place in a free nation where public sovereignty functions. In such nations no free people can accept intervention.

When people, however, have not gained political liberty because they are subject to any armed minority, then outside assistance is not intervention, it is liberation.

Such an assistance was an obligation, for the exist-

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9. New York Times, December 16, 1944, p. 7:8





ing conditions were the result of the war and the consequences of material and moral assistance given by the Allies to the guerrilla forces in Greece. Of course, if Greece had at her disposal the army of the people, the army she had in Albania, she would not have been in need of any assistance for the re-establishment of the people's liberties.

In the meantime the battle, which had been precipitated on December 6, steadily increased.

The British were not prepared. Most of the British soldiers were non-combat troops. There were only three combat units in Athens under Scobie's command; the paratroop brigade, the Third Greek Brigade, and a Spitfire squadron. Their total fighting strength was less than six thousand men to the estimated forty thousand ELAS force.<sup>10</sup>

On December 11 Field Marshall Alexander, who had taken command of the Mediterranean Theater, flew to Athens to make a personal reconnaissance of the situation. He quickly decided that reenforcements were necessary. Within two days the first troops arrived by air from Italy, and during the next two weeks a total of two complete British divisions came to the Athens area, as well as a brigade of the Fourth Indian Division and several miscellaneous battalions. These reenforcements were grouped under General Hawkesworthy's

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10. The Vradini (Greek Newspaper) December 9, 1947, p. 1:7.

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command.<sup>11</sup>

The British did not at once attack with their new-found superiority. Political considerations held them back.

Because Prime Minister Churchill was severely criticized for his imperialistic policy and primarily because of the turn affairs had taken, he decided to make an effort to bring a political settlement of the dispute. Accordingly, on Christmas Day, he and his Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, flew to Athens.<sup>12</sup>

On December 26 a conference was called and was attended by Mr. Papandreou, ELAS representatives and delegates from all the Greek parties. The conference was under the Presidency of Archbishop Damaskinos.

Mr. Churchill, speaking at the all-party conference, said:

"Why is it we British have come here? We came with the knowledge and approval of President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin. We also thought that at Caserta we had the invitation of all Greeks, including the commander of the ELAS army.

"Why is it we cannot leave? Since we have been here very violent and unexpected troubles have arisen and we have become involved in them through doing what we believed was our duty. That duty we shall discharge inflexibly and

11. London Times, December 14, 1944, etc. McNeil, W. H.-  
The Greek Dilemma, p. 184

12. London Times, December 27, 1944.

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faithfully to the end, but do not let anyone have in his mind the idea that Great Britain desires any material advantage from Greece." He continued, "We do not want one inch of your territory; we seek no commercial advantages save those which are offered by Greece to all nations of the world. We have not the slightest intention of interfering with the way in which a normal and tranquil Greece carries on its affairs. Whether Greece is a monarchy or a republic is a matter for the Greeks and the Greeks alone to decide...we hope that thus the voice of the Greek people shall be fully expressed in a sure way, as we expressed our voice in England and America by the method of elections based on a secret ballot, so that every man, rich or poor, has an equal right to cast his vote for citizenship.."13

The Allied representatives then left the discussions to the Greek delegates, who agreed on nothing save that the Archbishop Damaskinos should be appointed regent.

Mr. Churchill and Secretary Eden returned to London on December 29 and saw King George of Greece. Mr. Churchill discussed with the King the unanimous demands of the Greek political spokesmen that he yield his royal prerogatives, at least temporarily, to a regency.

All indications were that Mr. Churchill urged the King strongly to accede to the proposal for a one man regency.

King George virtually renounced his throne unless

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13. The Ethnos, (Greek newspaper) December 15, 1945, p. 1:6.

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the people of Greece, in a free election, called him back to rule. He appointed Archbishop Damaskinos as his Regent. Mr. Papandreou submitted his resignation.<sup>14</sup>

Thus in London, Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden reaped the first fruit of their Christmas visit to Athens.

Mr. Churchill would not have flown into a hornet's nest if the impasse were not more serious than previously judged or, if failure of lesser mediators, including Marshall Alexander and H. Macmillan, had not demonstrated there was no other way out. This journey would not have been undertaken merely to settle a feud in Greece. The fate of the British Government was also involved. The state of British public opinion indicates that, if times were normal, the Churchill Cabinet would certainly have fallen on this issue.

Archbishop Damaskinos began the formation of a new Government with a broad political base. He asked General Nicholas Plastiras, who forced the abdication of King Constantine by a military coup in 1922, to head the Cabinet.

By January 3 General Plastiras had selected a Cabinet and took office.<sup>15</sup> The Government was solidly anti-royalist. It was also anti-communist and was committed to carry on the struggle against ELAS.

14. Ibid., January 4, 1946, p. 1:5.

15. London Times, January 4, 1945

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Although the EAM-ELAS representatives originally had demanded a new Government as a primary point in their conditions for peace, there was no cessation in the fighting.

His experience in Athens had convinced Mr. Churchill that the Leftists would have to be crushed by superior weight of arms before they would accept terms satisfactory either to the British or to the other political leaders of Greece.

Accordingly, he ordered the British Generals in Greece to begin a full-scale offensive as soon as possible.

The ELAS Committee realized that their forces could no longer hope to hold Athens, and a general withdrawal was ordered. ELAS began to evacuate the city.

ELAS had been beaten. On January 11, delegates from the ELAS Headquarters came to General Scobie and arranged an armistice.

The leaders of ELAS and the British army signed a truce ending the Greek Civil War on January 15, 1945.<sup>16</sup>

President Roosevelt pledged Allied aid to Greece in a message to Premier Plastiras. In part it said:

"...I have been reassured by your recent statement that the cessation of hostilities will be the prelude to early decisions, by means of free democratic processes on the vexed questions which led to civil strife..."<sup>17</sup>

In British circles Prime Minister Churchill's

16. Newsweek, January 22, 1945.

17. New York Times, January 17, 1945, p. 12:2

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13. New York Times, January 17, 1945, p. 13:2  
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policy was still highly criticized. Arthur Greenwood, leader of the Labor Party in the House of Commons, and two other prominent members spoke out at separate meetings against it.

Seymour Cocks, Laborite, who first raised the issue of Britain's policy in Greece, demanded that Greece should be left alone or that the Labor Party should resign from the British Coalition Government.

Again Mr. Churchill spoke in the House of Commons on January 18 and explained his policy in Greece, and demanded a vote of confidence. He explained that plans were made years ahead for the Communist seizure of power in Greece, that among these Greek Communists there were also Bulgarian elements with, no doubt, territorial ideas of their own. He went on to say that not British policy, but Communist Ministers continuously threw sand in the wheels of the Greek Government at every stage. Now he said, "We must leave the process of broadening of the Government to the Greek people and try not to interfere. However, I tell the House quite plainly that His Majesty's Government will discharge their obligations, however painful, with complete integrity."

At the conclusion of the debate he received an overwhelming vote of confidence (340-7) on Britain's foreign policy.<sup>18</sup>

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18. London Times, January 20, 1945.

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Of course Parliamentary procedure intervened to distort the picture. The margin of the vote was no measure of the strength of the sentiment and conviction in the House against the British policy in Greece. Many of the members would no doubt vote differently on a simple issue of approval or disapproval.

Representatives of several Greek trade unions had condemned "the tyranny of the Communist Party" and asked for the cooperation of the British Trade Union Congress in the rebuilding of Greek trade unionism.

On January 22, 1945 a British Trade Union Council delegation, headed by Sir Walter Citrine, arrived in Athens, and was welcomed by Damaskinos who told the delegation that the investigation they were to make was welcomed by the Greek Government.<sup>19</sup>

The report of the T. U. C. said that political and economic conditions in Greece did not permit the withdrawal of British troops "justly and safely". The delegates found "wide-spread dead" and it went on to state that the British Government "might overthrow its responsibility" by withdrawing its troops prematurely. In 5,000 words the report discussed the mission's investigation of the Greek trade union movement and alleged atrocities committed during the civil war. It included the agreement reached with Greek labor lead-

19. New York Times. January 24, 1945. p.7:3.

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ers under which a British delegation would help supervise forthcoming Greek Union elections.

The report carefully refrained from directly assessing the blame for the atrocities allegedly committed by ELAS. But, speaking of the discovery of nearly 200 bodies of men, women, and children, all of whom had been shot through the head, the report said that investigations had shown that only ELAS forces could have been in the particular territory at the time medical evidence testified the people had been murdered.<sup>20</sup>

The conclusion of the T. U. C. that British troops must remain in Greece was in effect a justification of the British Government policy by a powerful labor body, although it was Labor M.P.s who had most bitterly attacked that policy in the House of Commons.

Although the report dealt mainly with labor matters, it touched on several other points raised by Prime Minister Churchill in the debates, and on each point the report supported the Prime Minister.

When the truce between ELAS and General Scobie was signed, the most pressing problem before the Government became the negotiation of a definite settlement with the Leftists.

At the time many persons in Athens expected the resumption of hostilities.

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20. New York Times. Feb. 9, 1945. p.6:5.

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The Greek Government began peace negotiations on



February 2 with the leaders of EAM at Varkiza.<sup>21</sup>

The settlement of problems that caused the Greek civil war came after ten days of negotiations.

By the terms of the Varkiza Agreement ELAS agreed to surrender all arms, and quotas for the various types of weapons were established as means of assuring that actual disarmament took place. With the exception of a few small guard detachments, disbandment of ELAS was to be completed within two weeks. Weapons were to be concentrated at specified points and handed over to British officers appointed by General Scobie to collect them.

In return for this concession, the Government agreed to maintain and uphold civil liberties and to publish an amnesty which would cover all "political" crimes committed during the civil war. The Government further promised to purge the state bureaucracy by means of special boards, but the criteria on which judgment was to be based were only vaguely recorded. The Army was to be recruited by age groups, but it was expressly provided that professional soldiers and reservists specially trained in modern weapons could be retained in service. This, in practice, meant that the Third Brigade and the Sacred Squadron would remain to form the core of a new Greek Army. The final provision was as follows:

At the earliest possible date, and in any case within the current year, there shall

21. "Kathimerina Nea", (Greek newspaper), Feb. 13, 1945. p.1:3.

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*The New York Times*, (Greek newspaper), Feb. 13, 1945, p. 1.



be conducted in complete freedom and with every care for its genuineness, a plebiscite, which shall finally decide on the Constitutional question all points being submitted to the decision of the people. Thereafter shall follow as quickly as possible election to a Constituent Assembly for the drafting of the new Constitution of the country. The representatives of both sides agree that, for the verification of the genuineness of the expression of the popular will, the great Allied Powers shall be requested to send observers.<sup>22</sup>

Lack of faith on both sides brought about the violation of the Varkiza Agreement immediately after the exchange of signatures.

The hastily recruited and violently anti-Communist National Guard units frequently resorted to harsh measures which largely nullified the amnesty promised under the Varkiza Agreement, while local Rightist bands also wrecked private vengeance on former members of the ELAS. Under these conditions many guerrillas, who might otherwise have laid down their weapons and returned home, were undoubtedly forced to keep their arms and to flee to the hills in self-defense.

At the same time the ELAS commanders instructed their henchmen to select the best arms from the amount they formerly promised to surrender. These arms were transported on pack animals to the mountains and hidden for the next occasion. Some 25,000 picked Communists were ordered to cross

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22. Official Newspaper of the Greek Government. March 23, 1945. No. 68. pp. 238-241.

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the frontiers and to pass to Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Most of them were sent to the Bulkes camp in the Voivodina, near Novi Sad where they trained as guerrilla fighters. Some of them were trained in Albania at the Rubig Camp, north of Tirana, and some at Berkovitsa, north of Sofia in Bulgaria.<sup>23</sup>

The decision on the part of the Communist leaders to seek aid from the regimes across the frontier, proved of crucial importance from several points of view. In the first place, it led to the re-establishment of the military strength of ELAS and made it only a matter of time and tactical calculation before new hostilities broke out between the Left and the Right in Greece.

Moreover, the Communists' action linked the internal Greek conflict with the rivalry between Russia and the Western Powers in the Balkans, thus giving vast international import to the political struggle in Greece. Finally, by identifying the Left with the country's traditional Slavic enemies to the north, the Communists drove many moderates, who disapproved of the excesses of the Government, towards the extreme Right, which, under these circumstances, became increasingly nationalistic.

23. Report of the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents to the Security Council, UN Document S/360, I, May 27, 1947. pp. 22-23, et  
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27. Report of the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents to the Security Council, UN Document S/360, I, May 27, 1947, pp. 22-23, at The Greek Tragedy, Smorgorzewski, E.M., Vol. II, p. 5.



### The Elections

With the publication of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe on February 11, 1945, the three powers, Britain, Russia, and the United States, formally assumed a responsibility for assisting liberated nations "to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population, and pledged to the earliest possible establishment, through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people, and to facilitate, where necessary, the holding of such elections"<sup>1</sup>.

The Varkiza Agreement, which provided for the plebiscite and elections stated that the representatives of both sides agree that, for the verification of the genuineness of the popular will, the Great Allied Powers shall be requested to send observers<sup>2</sup>.

Even before Varkiza, in the early days of the civil war, it was apparent that mutual hatred and suspicion among the Greeks had become so profound that an unprejudiced settlement of their internal affairs was unlikely to be achieved without the presence of impartial bystanders.

On August 20, 1945 the Greek Government issued an official announcement stating, "Today the Greek Government finds itself in the happy position of being able to announce

1. Making the Peace Treaties - 1941-1947, Department of State, Washington, D.C., Feb. 1947, p.11.
2. Official Newspaper of the Greek Government, cited.

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S. Official Newsmen of the Greek Government, cited.



that the negotiations with the Allied Governments have led to the acceptance by Great Britain, the United States of America and France, of the proposal that they should send observers. At the same time the Government regrets that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has not accepted the proposal on the grounds that it is opposed, in principle, to the supervision of national elections by foreign states."<sup>3</sup>

The Soviet Government had refused to participate in the supervision of the elections in Greece, in spite of the Yalta agreement, not because, as the Soviet said, "this watching is actually control by foreign governments over the activities of another government and it is incompatible with a state's independence as well as respect for the principle of democracy"<sup>4</sup>; but because, as Professor Philip E. Mosely of Columbia University, who was adviser to the United States delegation at Potsdam, stated, that Premier Stalin expressed regret during the Potsdam meeting over the agreement he had made at the Yalta Conference to permit free elections in Eastern Europe. He believed "a freely elected government in any of these countries (The Balkan States) would be anti-Soviet, and that we cannot allow."<sup>5</sup>

The three Governments, Great Britain, France, and

3. Report of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections. Department of State, Washington, D.C., Publication 2522, 1946, p.2.

4. Official Russian newspaper, "Izvestia", quoted New York Times, August 23, 1945, p.10:2,3.

5. New York Times. August 16, 1948. p. 3:5.

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3. Report of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections, Department of State, Washington, D.C., Publication 2322, 1946, p. 2.
4. Official Russian news paper, "Izvestia", quoted New York Times, August 23, 1945, p. 10:2, 3.
5. New York Times, August 16, 1945, p. 3:2.



and the United States formally accepted the Greek Government's invitation in a joint statement issued September 19, 1945.

The Greek Government by that time had adopted the view that the elections should precede the plebiscite, and had hoped that they might be held in the autumn.

The decision to postpone indefinitely the plebiscite on the monarchy was taken after the Regent Damaskinos, who had gone to London on September 6, had a long interview with British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin.

The United States, Great Britain, and France supported that decision and issued the following statement:

The three Governments hold the firm opinion that elections for a revisionary assembly should be held as soon as possible..... Thus a government would be formed which would be based on the wishes of the people and Parliament. The formation of such a Government would facilitate the restoration of stable tranquility in Greece. Only when these conditions are, in due course, firmly established will it become possible to hold a free and genuine plebiscite to decide on the future regime in Greece.<sup>6</sup>

When it became evident that Britain and the United States were pressing for early elections, a vigorous controversy arose in Greek political circles. The Royalists warmly agreed that elections should be hastened; the Liberals and the Leftists, on the contrary, realizing their weakness, insisted that the state of public disorder and terrorism in the country was such that honest elections could not be held.

6. New York Times. Sept. 20, 1945. p. 9:3.

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For some weeks Premier Petros Voulgaris, who had succeeded Nicholas Plastiras on April 7, 1945, hesitated between the two pressures. At length, at the beginning of October, he announced elections for January 20, 1946.

Even the January date for the elections was unsatisfactory for the Center and the Left. The Communist Party announced their intention of abstaining, when Nicholas Zachariades, the Secretary of the Greek Communist Party, returned from an international meeting of Communist leaders in Prague.<sup>7</sup> This decision was closely linked to the decision of the Soviet Government to take no part in the supervision of the elections. The Liberal, Progressive, Agrarian and Socialist Party leaders demanded a reorganization of the Government in return for their cooperation. Such an opposition to the election plans forced the resignation of Premier Petros Voulgaris.<sup>8</sup>

A month of crisis followed. For nearly three weeks Greece had no Cabinet. At length, on October 17, the Regent himself took over the office as provisional Premier. For two weeks this extraordinary government endured. The Regent replaced it, on November 1, by a new Government headed by Professor Panayiotis Kanellopoulos.<sup>9</sup>

A year of liberation had not sufficed to establish

7. Greece: We Cannot Afford A New Munich, -Healey, D. (Sec., International Dept., The Labour Party), Reprinted from the Labour Press Service, Feb., 1948. p.1.

8. New York Times, Oct. 10, 1945. p.21:7.

9. Ibid., Nov. 2, 1945. p. 4:8. et, Oct. 18, 1945. p. 8:3.

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7. Premier We Can't Afford A New Man... (Sec.)  
 International Dept., The Labor Party, Resisted from the  
 Labor Press Service, Feb. 1948, p. 1.  
 8. New York Times, Oct. 10, 1945, p. 21:7.  
 9. Ibid., Nov. 2, 1945, p. 4:5. et. Oct. 18, 1945, p. 3:3.



anything that could reasonably be considered recovery. Uncertainty and distress plagued the country. The new Government held power only by a sort of constitutional fiction, being based neither on election nor on any theory of dictatorship. It was unable to solve the political and economic problems.

In the emergency the Greek Government turned to Great Britain and the Labor Government, which had succeeded the Churchill Government on July, 1945, and Great Britain was forced to take a firm hand in Greek affairs again.

In November 1945, Hector McNeill, then undersecretary for foreign affairs, was sent to Greece to investigate the general situation.<sup>10</sup>

As a result of this visit the service Minister, Panayottis Kanellopoulos, was replaced by a government of politicians from the Center and Left, under the veteran Liberal, Themistocles Sophoulis.<sup>11</sup>

Absurd misunderstanding was common among all Greeks as to the nature of the Labor Party in Great Britain. With its victory, the Greek Leftists assumed that Great Britain would come to their succor and put them in power.

However, the attitude of Prime Minister Atlee's Government toward Greece was not much different from that of Winston Churchill's, as Ernest Bevin stated in the House of Com-

10. The Kathimerini, (Greek newspaper), Nov. 13, 1945. p.1:4.

11. New York Times. Nov. 21, 1945. p. 10:6.

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mons, that the British foreign policy would continue as under the preceding coalition government.<sup>12</sup>

In the meantime, the organization of the Mission was proceeding in London, Paris and Washington. On October 25, Henry F. Grady was designated Chief of the United States contingent; shortly thereafter R. T. Windle was named Chief of the British contingent, and General Arnaud Laparra was appointed to head the French group.<sup>13</sup>

In order to obtain a first-hand knowledge of the situation in Greece, and make arrangements for the operation of the Mission, Mr. Grady, Mr. Windle, and a representative for General Laparra met in London, where they held preliminary discussions, and then, accompanied by a military planning staff, consisting principally of United States officers, they proceeded to Athens where they were joined by General Laparra. This trip resulted in laying the foundation for close and cordial cooperation among the three participating nations, and between them and the Greek Government.

During their stay in Athens the Allied Chiefs of the Mission had the opportunity of talking not only with the Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, and Prime Minister Sophoulis, but also with the leaders of all the principal Greek political parties, and they found general accord, except on the part of the Communists. They agreed that the elections should be held

12. New York Times. Aug. 11, 1945. p. 9:8.

13. Report of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections  
Department of State, Washington, Publication 2522, 1946, P.3

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12. New York Times, Aug. 11, 1945, p. 3:8.  
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as soon as possible.

It was announced, on December 4, by Premier Themistocles Sophoulis, that the elections would be held on March 31, 1946.<sup>14</sup>

After the announcement of the date of elections, the Moscow radio started a new attack against Allied policy in Greece. They stated that the elections were being prepared by monarchists "under conditions of open fascist terror".<sup>15</sup>

The existence of a "regime of Terror" was strongly denied, although it was conceded that, as a result of the civil war, some unauthorized acts of reprisal had been committed which the Government lacked the proper force to prevent.

The official Communist newspaper, "Rizospastis", declared that party members would abstain from voting.<sup>16</sup>

An abstention from the elections in these circumstances could only have implied a belief by the parties concerned that they did not enjoy popular support and certainly such abstention could have been no reason for refusing to the people of Greece that chance of electing their government in accordance with their own free will.

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14. Ibid., p. 2.

15. New York Times. January 31, 1946, p. 4:5.

16. Ibid., February 3, 1946, p. 7:8.

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Whether these elections, in which the EAM coalition abstained and the Rightist parties won 234 out of the total of 354 seats in parliament, reflected the wishes of the Greek people was a heatedly debated question. According to the Allied Mission for Observing the Greek Elections, which consisted of more than 1200 American, British and French officials, the voting was, on the whole, fairly conducted and produced valid results.<sup>17</sup>

Although the Mission conceded that 40 per cent of the persons enrolled on the registration lists did not vote, it estimated on the basis of public opinion polls conducted on the eve of the elections that only between 10 and 20 per cent of this group abstained for political reasons.<sup>18</sup>

The Left, on the other hand, contended that the entire 40 per cent of the electorate which did not vote represented supporters of the EAM and the electoral results were largely falsified.

A review of the evidence indicates that, from the technical point of view, the elections were at least reason-

17. Report of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Election Department of State, Washington. Publication 2522, 1946. pp. 20-21.

18. Ibid., p. 31.

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17. Report of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Election Department of State, Washington, Publication 2522, 1946.  
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18. Ibid., p. 21.



ably fair and honest. While perhaps as large a group as 20 per cent of the electorate abstained for political reasons, the electoral results correctly reflected the predominant political sentiment of the country.

In judging the fairness of the voting, however, it is not enough to appraise its technical aspects, for the outcome of the elections was largely determined by their timing. Although the elections were held more than a year after the civil war, the atmosphere in which they took place, was so highly charged with fear of Communism and of the pro-Soviet countries to the north, that the victory of the Right was assured before any Greek voter went to the polls. Yet it appears extremely doubtful whether further postponement of the elections by several months or a year would have produced a political climate more conducive to a moderate outcome and resulting in the formation of a government acceptable to both Right and Left.

A Royalist Government was formed under the leadership of Constantine Tsaldaris.<sup>19</sup> The Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, submitted his resignation which was accepted on April 8 by King George of Greece.<sup>20</sup>

The new Government decided to settle the constitutional issue by a plebiscite. Although originally the British Government had suggested that the plebiscite be put off until

19. "The Kathimerini" Greek Newspaper. April 19, 1946. p.1:4.

20. "Ethnos" Greek Newspaper. April 8, 1946. p.2:6.

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20. "Eftichia" Greek Newspaper, April 8, 1946, p.2:6.



1948, knowing that the unsettled state of Greece would continue until it was held, they finally felt that the disadvantages of delay could be greater than the advantages.

The Greek Government requested the Allied Mission to remain and observe the actual voting in the plebiscite which was scheduled to be held on September 1, 1946.<sup>21</sup> The United States and Great Britain agreed to this. The Soviet Union, which declined to take part in the scheme for sending observers at the elections, had not been invited to observe the plebiscite.<sup>22</sup>

The plebiscite was held on September 1, 1946, and this time the Communists took part in the vote. However, out of 1,691,592 valid ballot papers 68.9 per cent declared for monarchy.

An Anglo-American mission, headed by Richard T. Windle and Leland Morris, checked the validity of revised electoral lists and observed the procedure of the plebiscite. On September 16 it issued a report stating that the plebiscite had "faithfully reflected the people's will".<sup>23</sup>

The leaders of the centre parties and Mr. Sophoulis declared that they considered the constitutional issue as definitely settled by the plebiscite. As real democrats, they were of the opinion that the will of a decisive majority of

21. New York Times. May 13, 1946. p. 1:2.

22. Ibid., May 11, 1946. p. 6:5.

23. Smogorzewski, K.M., The Greek Tragedy, -Jan., 1948. Vol. II, p.3.

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Fear of communism was clearly responsible for the victory of the monarchists in the plebiscite. The people voted not so much for the King, who was never popular with them, and who helped inflict the pre-war dictatorship of Metaxas upon them, but for law and order, for peace and stability, for independence and self-government. Even more, they voted against the revolutionary Left with its alien's ideology and alien auxiliaries and against the terror perpetrated by the Left during the civil war.

Above all, they demonstrated their determination not to become satellites of Russia, as are all their Balkan neighbors, but to remain what they have always been, a part of Western civilization and democracy, which originated in Greece.

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1. Year Book of the United Nations, 1946-1947, p. 736.
2. New York Times, January 25, 1948, p. 212.

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#### CHAPTER IV

##### The Greek Problem Before the United Nations Organization

Since the liberation of Greece, the international atmosphere has been poisoned by propaganda directed against the presence of British troops in Greece.

The controversy was finally solved when it was brought before the United Nations Organization by the Soviet Government.

Mr. Vishinsky, acting chief of the Soviet delegation, in a letter dated January 21, 1946, under article 35 of the Charter, requested the Security Council to discuss the situation in Greece on the grounds that the presence of British troops there, after the termination of the war, meant interference in the internal affairs of the country, and caused extraordinary tension fraught with grave consequences both for the Greek people and for the maintenance of peace and security.<sup>1</sup>

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At the same time the Greek Premier, Themistocles

1. Year Book of the United Nations. 1946-1947. p.336.

2. New York Times. January 23, 1946. p.2:2.





Sophoulis, made the first official statement showing the Greek reaction to the request of the Soviet Union, he said:

"British military forces are in Greece with the full consent of the Greek Government and are in earnest collaboration with it in retaining order."<sup>3</sup>

The Greek question was considered at the sixth meeting of the Security Council on February 1, 1946. A representative of Greece was asked to participate, without vote, in the discussions.<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Vishinsky argued that there were no reasons for the presence of British troops in Greece and insisted upon the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of these troops from that country.

Such charges from the representative of the USSR were answered by Mr. Bevin, representative of the United Kingdom, who stated that the Greek question was discussed at Yalta and Marshall Stalin had expressed complete confidence in the British policy in Greece. He demanded that the Council give an answer as to whether the British Government, acting in response to the request of the Greek Government in lending some of its forces to help bring about order and economic reconstruction in that country, endangered peace.<sup>5</sup>

The United States, France, Poland, China, and the Netherlands all told the Council that they did not think the

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3. New York Times. Jan. 23, 1946. p.9:1.

4. Year Book of the United Nations. 1946-1947. p.336.

5. Ibid., p. 337.

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reaction to the request of the Soviet Union, he said:

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British troops were endangering world peace and the Council was on the point of adopting a resolution to this effect, when Andrei Vishinsky claimed the right to veto such a resolution.

Mr. Vishinsky offered, in what he called "a spirit of friendly cooperation", to end the debate with the Council noting that the British were going to withdraw their troops as soon as possible. However, Ernest Bevin strenuously objected to such a conclusion.

The Soviet Union and Great Britain reached a compromise. Vishinsky agreed not to press his charge and withdrew his demand that the Council recommend the "immediate and unconditional" removal of British troops from that country. In the same conciliatory manner Bevin offered to retract his demand that the Security Council issue a formal declaration acquitting Britain of the charges made by the Soviet Union and the issue was closed.<sup>6</sup>

The presence of British troops was considered a necessity by all the successive Greek Governments since the liberation of Greece. They disembarked in Greece, not at their own initiative, but at the request of the Greek Government, and in fulfillment of an agreement reached in Italy and signed by the representatives of all political elements, not excepting those of the extreme Left.

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6. Year Book of the United Nations, p. 338.

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British troops before the elections. This, they believed, would aid the efforts of EAM to establish a Government "friendly" to the Soviet Union and might thus accomplish Russia's fundamental objectives to break the British alliance with Greece and to obtain bases in the Greek islands and in the Dardanelles.

The Russian press and radio did not stop reproducing the propaganda of EAM, and did not hesitate to call the Greek Government Fascist. In March 1946 the Russian Ambassador suggested that Greece should cede one of the Dodecanese island to Russia as a base for shipping so that supplies of grain could be sent from Russia to the Greeks. This idea was firmly refused by the Greek Government and the Russians dropped the matter without further discussion.<sup>7</sup> Implied Russian support for Bulgarian claims to an outlet on the Aegean shocked and terrified the Greeks. Official relations became more frigid and correct.

In July 1946 the Peace Conference assembled at Paris. Prime Minister Tsaldaris attended in person, hoping to emulate the successes of his predecessor, Eleftherios Venizelos, and win for Greece new territories. It soon became evident, however, that the Russians were strongly opposed to the Greek claims, and that the United States and Great Britain were at best lukewarm to the Greek hopes of

7. McNeill, W. H., The Greek Dilemma, p. 259

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territorial changes.

The Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, George Kulishev, backed by the Soviet Union, not only opposed the Greek demands but he claimed to be recognized as a co-belligerent, to be relieved of all or part of her reparation obligations and to obtain Western Thrace from Greece.<sup>8</sup>

Cession of this area would give Bulgaria an outlet to the Aegean, and bring the Soviet influence to that sea. Bulgaria was trying to obtain from the Allies what she could not obtain from Hitler.

In this bid Bulgaria was supported also by Poland and the Ukraine. The Foreign Minister, Dmitry Manuilisky, of the Ukraine, supporting Bulgarian claims, said Greece's "unsubstantiated pretentions" and "desire to make a peace that would tend to new wars" had rendered incomplete the pacification of the Balkans otherwise achieved by this war.<sup>9</sup>

This assault was vigorously opposed by Premier Constantine Tsaldaris on behalf of Greece. He expressed astonishment at the spectacle of an enemy country making territorial claims against an Allied country.

Tsaldaris' unsuccessful demands against Albania and Bulgaria at the Peace conference did not help to improve relations with Russia.

8. New York Times, August 15, 1946, p. 1:4.

9. New York Times, August 15, 1946, p. 1:4.





On August 24, 1946, Manuilsky asked the Security Council of the United Nations, under article 34 of the Charter, to consider the threat to world peace which the policies of the Greek Government offered. He specifically accused Greece of fomenting border incidents, of seeking to take over by force the southern part of Albania and of persecuting minorities; and requested the Security Council of the United Nations to consider and concert steps to deal with the threat to peace which these acts had created in the Balkans.<sup>10</sup>

Ambassador Vassilis Dendramis, Greek representative to the United Nations, welcomed the Ukrainian move. In an oral statement he said,

"I am very glad that this question was brought before the Security Council. In this way the members of the United Nations and world opinion will realize which are the peace-loving countries and which are the countries provoking war... Greece has been the outstanding proponent of the great ideals of peace and freedom of the Balkans".<sup>11</sup>

Despite the long-standing Communist propaganda campaign against her, Greece needed no defense in this accusation. She proved her quality during the war where her gallant resistance, aided by the British, so delayed the Germans as to constitute a major contribution to the salvation of Russia, and is today the only citadel of freedom east of Russia's iron curtain. But she is under terrific pressure

10. Year Book of the United Nations 1946-1947, p. 351.

11. New York Times, August 25, p. 7:1-6.





from her Russian controlled neighbors, one of whom, Bulgaria, Germany's ally in two world wars, has had the temerity to demand Greek territory at the Paris Conference.

The Ukrainian charge was, accordingly, put on the agenda and was discussed between August 28, and September 20, 1946.<sup>12</sup>

The debate turned into a fruitless discussion of border quarrels between Greek and Albanian frontier guards. Representatives of various Russian satellite nations accused the Greeks of aggressive intentions, and dwelled on the malicious influence extended by the presence of British troops which, they charged, encouraged Greek collaborators and reactionaries to stir up trouble in the Balkans.

Mr. Dendramis heatedly denied the charges and was supported by the British delegate to the United Nations.

Andrei Gromyko, Soviet delegate to the United Nations Security Council, introduced a resolution, on September 16, denouncing "aggressive Greek monarchists" for their alleged policies towards Greece and criticizing the British Government for not having withdrawn its troops after the elections last March. He asserted such a withdrawal had been pledged by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin of Britain. The Soviet resolution also provided that the Security Council

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12. United Nations and the Problem of Greece. Department of State Publication 2909, Washington D. C., 1947. p. 1.





should keep the Greek question on its agenda until the Greek Government had complied with Council recommendation to end "the provocative actions of aggressive monarchist elements in the Greek-Albanian frontier"; stop the propaganda concerning the supposed state of war between Albania and Greece and halt "persecution" of minorities.

This resolution was rejected by a vote of 9-2.<sup>13</sup>

At the 69th meeting another resolution was proposed by the United States delegate, H. V. Johnson, that a sub-committee be appointed with full authority to inquire into the border incidents and inform the Security Council accordingly.

The United States resolution was vetoed. Although it obtained eight (8) affirmative votes, it was not carried as a result of the negative vote of the USSR.<sup>14</sup>

For the second time the Security Council of the United Nations disposed of, by an overwhelming majority, the Russian charges that Greece and Britain were endangering international peace and security.

In the first case, decided in February 1946, Russia stood so completely alone against all the other Council members, that she decided to withdraw the charges and the Council dropped the case.

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13. Year Book of the United Nations, p. 358.

14. Year Book of the United Nations, p. 360.





In this case, forcing the issue to a vote, Russia was able to rally only her Polish satellite to her side.

The vindication of both countries by the supreme organ of world opinion could not be more complete. And the final commentary of the Russian charges was provided by Russian veto of the American resolution to investigate the situation along the whole Greek frontier.

The Soviet Union, by vetoing the United States resolution, showed the guilt of Greece's northern neighbors and her own. This proved that the Soviet Union was using the United Nations only when it fitted her own political interests and refused to bring the case on the bar of international justice, and to the judgment of world public opinion.

However, this new Russian veto could not, of itself, have disposed of a situation, the danger of which was being attested daily by frontier incidents such as have served often enough in the past to precipitate more serious conflicts.

There was no doubt that leftist bands in Northern Greece were in open revolt against the established Government and there was reason to suspect, as the Greek Government charged, that these bands were being armed and reenforced from Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. But only a thorough and impartial investigation could have established the truth of the matter.

Premier Constantine Tsaldaris, before leaving for





New York to lay Greece's northern border troubles before the United Nations Security Council, summoned Soviet Charge d' Affaires, Nicolai Chernychev, to the Foreign Office and gave him formal notification that Greece would lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council charging that "foreign sources" are inspiring and directing disorders and violence in Northern Greece.

The Premier informed the Soviet envoy that Greece was eager to maintain friendly relations with all powers, and in lodging the complaints his Government's only purpose was to protect international security and preserve peace in the Balkans.<sup>15</sup>

Whether the specific Greek charges of foreign intervention were justified or not, it was for the Security Council to determine. But there was prima facie evidence to support them. This evidence is based on both press and official reports, not only from Greece, but also from neighbors who had become Russia's puppets. Steadily and inexorably, Russian might, which had already engulfed half of Europe, continued to press against the power vacuums along its periphery and a pause in one spot only seemed to increase the pressure in others. Just then, with the chances for agreement on the peripheral European peace treaties brightening, Russian pressure appeared to be increasing in Greece, which is the last remaining obstacle to Russian domination of the Eastern

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15. New York Times, December 1, 1946. p. 1:2.





Mediterranean.

For that reason there was an inherent credibility in the Greek charges that Communist-dominated Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania maintained camps for the training of Greek guerrilla bands; that these bands were supplied with arms and were frequently sent across the Greek border; that they were often joined by Yugoslav, Bulgarian, and Albanian Communists and that Yugoslav army officers had been detected, on occasions, as leaders of such bands. Certainly Russian propaganda against Greece provided encouragement for such activities.

Only the British troops in Greece provided some sense of security and stability but foreign troops, with even the best intentions, quickly outstay their welcome. Therefore, the Security Council owed it to Greece to investigate promptly and, at first hand, these charges.

Greece formally submitted her border disputes with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania to the United Nations Security Council by a communication dated December 3, 1946. This was supported by a memorandum which outlined the incidents in the northern border of Greece.

Mr. Dendramis, Greece's permanent representative in the United Nations, said that the situation was being submitted to the Council under articles 34 and 35 of the Charter and requested that the Security Council give early consider-





ation to a situation which, it was charged, was leading to friction between Greece and her northern neighbors. He requested, furthermore, that particular attention be paid by the Security Council to the urgent necessity for an investigation to be undertaken on the spot, in order that the cause of the situation be brought to light.<sup>16</sup>

At the eighty-second meeting, on December 10, 1946, the Council resolved to invite the representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia to participate in the discussion without a vote. The representative of Albania and Bulgaria, which countries were not members of the United Nations, were invited to enable the Security Council to hear such declarations as they might wish to make.<sup>17</sup>

During the eighty-third session Premier Constantine Tsaldaris of Greece appeared before the Security Council to warn that the "state of undeclared war" in the Balkans was reaching its most acute phase. He appealed to the Council to take some measures to end the "tragic situation". Going into particulars, he said that Greece's neighbors, by focusing attention on the State of Macedonia, might be laying the groundwork for a new "Drang nach Osten".

The purpose of the alleged concentrated campaign against Greece, he went on, is to deprive her of Macedonia --

16. Year Book of the United Nations. 1946-1947. p.360.

17. The United Nations and the Problem of Greece. Department of State Publication 2909, Washington, D.C., 1947. p.2.





a region which is Greek to the highest degree -- and make it part of Yugoslavia.

As proof of the drive to separate Macedonia from Greece, Mr. Tsaldaris submitted a statement from Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia, which he said had been made to an American correspondent on October 16. This, as he quoted it, said:

"The problem of Aegean Macedonia was not raised by our Government as one of those which ought to have been settled in the final phase of the Peace Conference. Nevertheless, it should be understood that we cannot remain indifferent to the situation arising from the persecution of the population of Macedonia by the organs of the Greek Government.

"I cannot tell you what are the measures that we shall take, but we shall certainly take measures intended to put an end to the terrorization of minorities in Greece, and particularly of those in Aegean Macedonia."

Mr. Tsaldaris also had a few words to say about Albania and Bulgaria. He said, "Bandits" from Bulkis were transferred to Bulgaria and housed and fed under the "paternal protection of the Sofia authorities". "In Albania", he continued, "matters are arranged more informally and the terrorists of the Bulkis there receive the most liberal hospitality at the hands of the Albanian authorities."<sup>18</sup>

The representatives of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania argued that the accusation against them had no basis in fact.

As a positive resolution to the problem the repre-

<sup>18</sup>. New York Times. December 13, 1946. p. 1:5.





sentative of Yugoslavia proposed an investigation of conditions inside Greece at the earliest possible moment.

The United States delegate, Herschel Johnson, at the eighty-fifth meeting of the Security Council on December 18, proposed that the Security Council, without passing any judgment, establish a commission to ascertain the facts as to alleged border violations with authority to conduct on-the-spot investigations in such areas of the four countries concerned as the commission might deem necessary, and to report the results to the Security Council.<sup>19</sup>

This draft resolution, which was modified by amendments presented by the Representatives of Mexico, Poland and the United Kingdom, was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on December 19, 1946.<sup>20</sup>

This same resolution was vetoed three months earlier by Russia. She still tried to bend it to her own purposes by insisting on the investigation, not so much of the border warfare, as of the presence of British troops in Greece. But, having been defeated in that effort twice before, she now fought only a rearguard action to cover up a retreat.

The adopted resolution authorized the Commission to conduct investigations, not only in Northern Greece, but also in other places in Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia,

19. The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XV, No.391, Dec. 29, 1946. Publication 2714, Washington, D.C. p.1171. et, Security Council, Official Records, No. 27, pp. 630-631.

20. Security Council, Official Records. No. 28, pp. 700-701.





wherever it might have decided to go, and to call upon the Governments, officials and nationals of these countries, as well as other sources, for information.

But, if there was any Government that needed investigating, it was not the Government of Greece, which, with all its shortcomings, was the product of elections supervised by the Allies, but rather the Governments of her neighbors. For these had been created by foreign might, rather than by the will of their peoples, and ruled by terror.

According to the formal charges of the Greek Premier, they helped terrorize the population and provoke civil strife in Greece. These charges were backed not only by official and press reports from neutral sources, but by the whole trend of Communist and Pan-Slavic propaganda.

This propaganda proclaimed Greek Macedonia a Slavic irredenta and represented Marshall Tito as the "protector" of the Macedonians and therefore unable to remain "indifferent" to what was happening to them. In all this there were sinister overtones reminiscent of the late Nazi and Pan-German movement.

The investigation Commission would have failed in its duty if it had not looked into this aspect of the case, for, in such movements, lies a real threat to peace.

Soon after the adoption of the resolution by the Security Council, the Secretariat of the United Nations began making preparations for operations and transport of the Com-





mission and the eleven members of the Security appointed their representatives.<sup>21</sup>

The Commission arrived in Athens on January 29, 1947,<sup>22</sup> where its work consisted of the problems of initial organization and then proceeded in its on-the-spot investigations from various bases.

The report of the United Nations Commission was led before the Security Council in June 1947; a subsidiary group of the Commission continued to collect evidence until the end of July in spite of sabotage and obstructions by the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. They refused to allow any investigation of incidents inside their own borders. The Commission's report provided ample evidence that Greece's three northern neighbors had encouraged, assisted, trained and supplied the Greek guerrillas. All but the Polish and Soviet delegates agreed to propose that the Security Council should recommend that the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia establish good-neighborly relations, and should consider any further foreign aid to the guerrillas in Greece as a threat to the peace. They also proposed that a small permanent body should be set up to watch Greece's northern frontier.<sup>23</sup>

21. For complete list of Commission see United Nations Security Council Report, by the Commission of Investigation, Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents to the Security Council. S/360, annex I, vol. II, pp. 255-258.

22. Year Book of the United Nations, 1946-1947. p.362.

23. Report by the Comm. of Investigation Concerning Greece to the Security Council. S/AC.4/280 May 22, 1947. pp.167-252.

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22. Year Book of the United Nations, 1946-1947, p. 352.  
23. Report by the Commission of Investigation concerning Greece to the Security Council, S/350 May 25, 1947, pp. 157-158.



The discussion of this report by the Security Council began on July 27, and lasted over a month. Cadogan, the British representative, made it clear that the situation revealed by the report constituted exactly the type of threat to the peace to remove which, the United Nations existed, and said:

"If we cannot apply proposals such as those submitted by the Commission, we had better tear up the Charter and pack up."<sup>24</sup>

Although only Poland and herself opposed these proposals, Russia again applied her veto. For a further six weeks attempts were made to obtain some action which might contribute to reducing the danger of war; after Gromyko had used his veto three times more to frustrate the will of the majority, the Security Council removed the problem from its agenda so that it could be dealt with by the General Assembly, in which the veto does not apply.

Meanwhile, the prolonged dislocation of Greek economic and political life was involving Britain in an expenditure of manpower and money which she could not afford.

On February 24, 1947, the British Ambassador notified the United States that His Majesty's Government would be obliged to terminate all economic assistance to Greece at the end of the fiscal year on March 31, and to withdraw the 10,000 British troops in Greece soon thereafter.<sup>25</sup>

24. Healey, Denis.—Greece; We Cannot Afford A New Munich, cited. p. 2.

25. New York Times, March 2, 1947.

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The main objective of the United States foreign policy was to block the expansion of the Soviet Union; to create a new balance of power in Europe, and to demonstrate to the Moscow Government that the United States was not going to preach and run this time.

This admittedly was a negative policy but, the argument continues, there was no safe alternative. The United Nations did not have the power nor the ability to halt the Soviet advance. Therefore, wherever the United States found Soviet diplomacy active in seeking influence or control in key strategic areas, it opposed the moves and cooperated with others who were opposing them, even though, as in Greece, Washington did not approve of the Government leading that opposition.

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A strong appeal for American assistance, without delay, had been made in a note from the Greek Government on March 3. This appeal recited the systematic devastation of Greece, the decimation and debilitation of her people, and the destruction of her economy through invasion and protracted enemy occupation, as well as through the internal disturbances which followed in the wake of war. It set forth the urgent need for financial, economic and expert assistance to attack the problems of reconstruction and to enable Greece to survive as a self-respecting independent nation. It said candidly that the destruction in Greece had been so complete as to rob the Greek people of the power to meet the situation by themselves.<sup>27</sup>

President Truman outlined a new foreign policy for the United States in a historical message to Congress on March 12, 1947. He proposed that this country intervene, wherever necessary throughout the world, to prevent the subjection of free peoples to Communist-inspired totalitarian regimes at the

27. The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 402, March 16, 1947. Publication 2779, Washington, D.C. p. 493.

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27. The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 402, March 15, 1947. Publication 2779, Washington, D.C. p. 492.



expense of their national integrity and importance. He requested that \$466,000,000 be granted for aid to Greece and Turkey up to June 30, 1948, to bolster the hard-pressed Greek and Turkish Governments against Communist pressure. This grant was passed at the beginning of May by a most decisive vote.<sup>28</sup>

Sharp condemnation of President Truman's policy had been the Russian reaction: It was imperialistic, it was reactionary, it endangered peace, it aimed at world domination.

President Truman called this nation to meet the challenge -- the international situation created by Russo-Communist aggression -- by immediate action to support the free nations of the world in order to guard United States victory and United States security.

Greece was being threatened of its very existence by the terrorist activities of a militant minority spearheaded by men who were led by Communists and presumably received aid and comfort from Greece's Communist neighbors. The Greek Government was not perfect, but in representing eighty-five per cent of the Greek Parliament, chosen in elections held under Allied supervision, it did better than most and deserved support.

If Greece had fallen under Communist domination, the effect upon the Middle East and upon all European countries struggling to maintain their freedom would have been disastrous, not only for them, but also for the United States.

28. The Department of State Bulletin, Supplement, Aid to Greece and Turkey, Vol.15, No. 409 A, May 4, 1947, Publication 2802. p. 829.

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18. The Department of State Bulletin, Supplement, Aid to Greece and Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 409, May 4, 1947, Publication 2832, p. 829.



The United States was further accused of having undermined the United Nations by having followed that policy. However, the United States took action in defense of the Charter under such urgent circumstances because the United Nations was, as yet, unable to act either effectively or in time. Until the United Nations was strong enough to compel all its members to obey its laws, the United States, as the most powerful democracy, could not allow violations of the Charter.

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### CONCLUSION

The Greek problem is an international one; it involves the Great Powers. It is impossible to treat this problem simply as an internal strife.

The Soviet Union and her satellites have repeatedly made it clear that they regard Greece as a key position on the frontier between the two camps into which they have divided the world. Russia has been trying to expand her defense as far and as fast as possible, without regard for the rights of the people who stood in her way. And in doing so, Stalin has followed the historical path of the Russian Tsars,-- the drive for control of Eastern Europe and the Middle East from Tripoli to the Persian Gulf. So far, all attempts to bend Persia, Turkey and Greece to her will by threats and blackmail have failed. But, if by giving armed support to a fifth column, the Slav bloc were permitted to gain direct control of Salonika and Northern Greece, the will to resist in Turkey and Persia might be broken and, if necessary, the same tactics could be applied to them in turn -- in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. Greece, therefore, presents the Western Powers with a moral test as crucial as Czechoslovakia in 1938 - a test of which the outcome would be decisive for small nations throughout Europe and Asia.

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Communist success in Greece would bring Russian power and influence into the Eastern Mediterranean, and go a long way toward assuring the Russians of predominance in all of that troubled area. With the Communist axiom that power begets power, Russia is trying to enforce a totalitarian regime by forceful imposition upon unwilling peoples by political infiltration and indirect aggression. Neither the United States nor Great Britain is willing to accede passively to such an increase in Russian power. It is for this reason that Britain and the United States have hoped for economic and political stabilization in Greece, and have sent such large amounts of relief supplies to that country.

Neither Great Britain and the United States or Russia directs its policy toward the benefit of the Greeks. If Greece benefits, it is only incidentally; if she suffers, it is equally incidental. It suits British and American strategic purposes to keep Greece intact, which also seems to coincide with the best interests of the Greek people. But it suits Russian strategic purposes to break up Greece. Thus the fate of Greece in a very large part has come, inescapably, to depend on the remorseless action of the Russian millstone grinding heavily against the Anglo-American. It is a sad and anguishing position for a proud people.

A free Greece however is the bastion which guards the safety of both the Mediterranean and the whole Near East and this has been achieved by the Greek people who, in con-

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trast to other East-European nations, refused to bow to a Communist tyranny after experiencing its horrors in their midst. Also, some credit is due to the Greek Government, ( a product of the first post-war elections held under international supervision), This government carried on as best it could in the face of all difficulties and its own shortcomings, despite a widespread Left-Wing campaign which attempted to smear it as "fascist" and extolled the Communist leaders as democrats and patriots.

However, while credit belongs to the Greek people's willingness to resist aggression, their resistance would have been futile without England's support at her most crucial hour, and furthermore, without the military and economic aid which the United States provided at a decisive moment, when Great Britain was forced to withdraw.

The Truman Doctrine, though still controversial, was nevertheless one of the most important products of the bipartisan American foreign policy and one of the first challenges, to unlimited Russian expansion that threatened to engulf all Europe. The triumph is not yet complete. Much remains to be done to heal the wounds of war and internal strife and put Greece on her feet again. It will be, however, the test of our values, which can prove to the shattered peoples of the world that democracy offers a working alternative to the totalitarian order which would otherwise be their only refuge.

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